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Not This Child: Constitutional Questions
in Regulating Noninvasive Prenatal Genetic
Diagnosis and Selective Abortion
Jaime Staples King
ABSTRACT
Recent developments in abortion politics and prenatal genetic testing are currently on
a collision course that has the potential to change the way we think about reproduction
and reproductive rights. In the fall of 2011, the first noninvasive prenatal genetic test
for Down syndrome entered the commercial market, offering highly accurate prenatal
genetic tests from a sample of a pregnant woman's blood without posing a risk to the
fetus or the mother. In the last five years, over fifty biotechnology start-ups have been
created to offer noninvasive prenatal diagnosis (NIPD) for an ever-widening range of
genetic and chromosomal conditions. Because of its noninvasive nature, relatively low
cost, and early timing, NIPD has the potential to become standard prenatal care for all
pregnant women, providing them information on hundreds of genetic and chromosomal
characteristics of their prospective offspring soon after they discover the pregnancy
Moreover, the technological development ofNIPD has occurred alongside a significant
political development: A handful of states have passed or attempted to pass legislation
that restricts abortion based on the reasons for which it was sought. These laws have mainly
prohibited abortions sought for sex- or race-based reasons, but proposed legislation would
also restrict abortions sought for a wider range of genetic conditions.
The collision of these political and technological developments raises two questions
regarding reproductive autonomy: (1) whether the Fourteenth Amendment protects a
-woman's right to abort a fetus for any reason; and (2) whether that protection includes
the right to access genetic tests that could inform the abortion decision. This Article
argues for the reaffirmation of a woman's right to choose to abort for any reason and
grounds that right in strong principles of liberty and autonomy, rather than sex equality.
In the context of reproductive genetic testing, the Article identifies a legitimate state
interest, previously unrecognized in abortion jurisprudence, in avoiding significant harm
to society based on widespread discriminatory selective abortion. The Article then
proposes a new framework for examining the regulation of reproductive genetic testing
that balances the relevant state and individual interests in a novel manner.
60 UCLA L. REV. 2 (2012)
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INTRODUCTION
Recent developments in prenatal genetic testing and abortion politics have
the potential to redefine the way we think about reproduction and reproductive
rights. In late 2009, a bipartisan majority of the Oklahoma state legislature
passed the Statistical Reporting of Abortion Act,' which, among other things,
prohibited any abortion provider from knowingly performing an abortion sought
solely because of the fetus's sex.2 With respect to the ban on sex-selective
abortions, Daniel Sullivan, a member of the Oklahoma House of Representatives,
stated, "As designer babies become more prevalent, we must do all we can to
ensure unborn children are not killed because a dad always dreamed of having
a son."3
In response to the Oklahoma law's passage, a number of other state legisla-
tures have introduced bills that seek to regulate abortions sought for reasons the
state deems inappropriate.! I refer to these types of restrictions as reasons-based
abortion prohibitions (RBAPs). Most RBAPs ban providers from performing
an abortion if they know a woman seeks the procedure because of her fetus's sex
or race.s However, Americans United for Life, a high-profile political group,
drafted model legislation to encourage states to prohibit abortions sought because
of any genetic anomaly.' In March 2012, John McCaherty, a member of the
Missouri House of Representatives, adopted much of the language proposed by
Americans United for Life and introduced the Abortion Ban for Sex Selection
and Genetic Abnormalities Act of 2012' to prohibit an abortion solely because of
the unborn child's sex or a genetic-abnormality diagnosis.'
1. H.B. 1595, 52d Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2009).
2. Id.
3. Press Release, Okla. House of Representatives, Pro-Life Legislation Passes House Committee
(Feb. 17,2009), http://www.okhouse.gov/OkhouseMedia/ShowStory.aspx?MediaNewsID=2936.
4. Susan B. Anthony and Frederick Douglass Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act, H.B. 2443, 50th
Leg., 1st Sess. (Ariz. 2011); see abo AMERICANS UNITED FOR LIFE, BAN ON ABORTIONS FOR
SEX SELECTION AND GENETIC ABNORMALITIES: MODEL LEGISLATION &POLICY GUIDE
FORTHE 2012 LEGISLATIVE YEAR 13 (2011).
5. AMERICANS UNITED FOR LIFE, supra note 4, at 2.
6. Id. at 9.
7. H.B. 1933, 96th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2012).
8. Public hearings were held on May 2, 2012 to discuss the implications of the bill. Activity Historyfor
HB 1933, Mo. HOUSE REPS., http://www.house.mo.gov/BillActions.aspx?bill= HB1933&year=
2012&code= R (last visited Sept. 15, 2012).
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The growing state interest in regulating abortions sought for certain reasons
coincides with a recent development in prenatal genetic testing, known as nonin-
vasive prenatal diagnosis (NIPD),' which has the potential to provide parents
with a large amount of genetic information about their fetus early in the first
trimester.10
To understand the significance of these scientific developments, consider the
following hypothetical that envisions the potential capabilities NIPD may have
in the future?' Imagine discovering that you or your partner is pregnant. At your
first obstetrical appointment, your doctor sends you to the laboratory to confirm
the pregnancy and to conduct a number ofblood tests. Within two weeks, you re-
ceive a report describing hundreds of genetic characteristics. You learn that the
fetus is a girl with no major genetic or chromosomal disorders, but she has genes
associated with an increased risk of a peanut allergy, eczema, and anxiety. She will
have blond hair, brown eyes, and fair skin. She will have a 40 percent chance
of developing a significant learning disability, but she also has a rare constellation of
alleles believed to be associated with musical giftedness. You are also informed
that you have a range of options. You may continue the pregnancy, or you can
elect to terminate. If you decide to terminate very quickly, you may take pills to
induce a medical abortion. If you decide to wait to terminate, you will need a
surgical abortion. How will you weigh these options?
Of course, you might not have all of these options-it depends on how the
government responds to widespread availability of NIPD. Should the govern-
ment regulate to protect society from the potential harms brought about by the
aggregated individual decisions that NIPD makes possible? Can it pass laws
to restrict access to selective abortion or NIPD? How will the development of
NIPD affect our reproductive rights? This Article begins the discussion of such
questions and proposes a framework for balancing the relevant interests at stake
with respect to regulation of NIPD testing.
9. Noninvasive means noninvasive of the uterus, rather than noninvasive of the body, as retrieving
blood from the mother will still require a needle stick This technology is generally referred to in
the literature as noninvasive prenatal diagnosis (NIPD). I use this terminology in this Article, but I
use it in a way that captures testing for genes associated with all genetic conditions, including
nonmedical conditions and predispositions to disease, not just those for which the test provides a di-
agnosis of a disease. A growing, but smaller, subset of the literature refers to the technology as
noninvasive prenatal testing (NIPT).
10. Caroline Wright, Non-invasive PrenatalDiagnosis Hits the National News, PHG FOUND. (June 23,
2008), http://www.phgfoundation.org/news/4252.
11. Currently, NIPD testing cannot offer information on all of these conditions. Each of these con-
ditions, however, has a genetic component, such that testing for a predisposition to such conditions
may be possible in the future.
6
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Advances in technology often drive change within the law. This is especially
true in the reproductive rights realm. The development of the birth control pill
made contraception socially ubiquitous and eventually led to the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Griswold v. ConnecticuP2 to invalidate state bans on contra-
ception use. Improvements in perinatology and neonatology enabled babies born
earlier and earlier to survive outside the womb.13 These improvements challenged
the trimester framework established in Roe v. Wade,14 which contributed to the
Supreme Court's decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey" to establish a viability standard to identify the moment when the govern-
ment's interest in protecting unborn fetal life becomes compelling enough to
prohibit abortion.'" Since that time, in nearly all states, a woman has been able
to have an abortion for any reason prior to the fetus becoming viable outside the
woman's womb."
However, the recent state interest in regulating the reasons for seeking abor-
tion and the introduction of NIPD provide an impetus to reconsider the bounds
of reproductive autonomy. As reproductive technologies provide pregnant
women with more and more information about their fetuses, the scope of deci-
sions women face will also expand." NIPD has the potential to enable a woman
to test her fetus for hundreds of genetic and chromosomal" conditions soon after
12. 381 U.S. 479,485-86 (1965).
13. Fergus Walsh, Prem Baby Survival Rates Revealed, BBC NEWS (Apr. 11, 2008, 4:05 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/7340288.stm (quoting Professor Kate Costeloe, a neonatal
pediatrician: "There has been a statistically significant increase in survival at 24 and 25 weeks, but
not at 23 weeks."); Early Baby Survival 'Unchanged,' BBC NEWS (May 9, 2008, 1:26 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/7390522.stm ("For 24-week babies, survival rose from 24 to
41%, while for 25-week babies it went up from 52 to 63%. There was no change in the proportion
of babies born at 23 weeks surviving, remaining at just under 20%.").
14. 410 U.S. 113,164-65 (1973).
15. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
16. Id. at 860.
17. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 221 (1973) (White, J., dissenting) (stating that when an abortion is
sought because of "convenience, family planning, economics, dislike of children, the embarrassment
of illegitimacy, ... for any one of such reasons, or for no reason at all,... any woman is entitled to
an abortion at her request").
18. Reproductive testing technologies include prenatal genetic testing, ultrasound, and urinalysis.
Prenatal Testing, REPROD. HEALTH TECHS. PROJECT, http://www.rhtp.org/fertility/prenatal/
default.asp (last visited Aug. 17, 2012).
19. Humans have forty-six chromosomes, twenty-three from their mother and twenty-three from their
father. The chromosomes are long strands of genes. In each of the approximately twenty thousand
genes composing each chromosome there is a genetic code that guides growth, development, or
health. See CTR. FOR GENETICS EDUC., GENES AND CHROMOSOMES: THE GENOME
(2012), available at http://www.genetics.edu.au/pdf/factsheets/fs01.pdf. For brevity, I refer to
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discovering she is pregnant.20 This development raises two questions regarding
reproductive autonomy: (1) whether the Fourteenth Amendment protects a
woman's right to abort a previable fetus for any reason; and (2) whether that
protection includes the right to access genetic tests that could inform abortion
and other decisions. If NIPD filfills its potential, it has the capacity to revolu-
tionize both the way we have children and the way we conceptualize reproductive
rights.2' Its recent entry into the prenatal genetic testing market makes this the
perfect time to consider its potential impact at both an individual and societal level.
This Article analyzes the states' ability to restrict a woman's right to have an
abortion for specific reasons as well as their ability to prohibit NIPD testing for
certain conditions that might serve as a basis for seeking an abortion. Part I briefly
describes NIPD and how it differs from current prenatal genetic testing tech-
niques.22 Part II examines two main theories underlying abortion jurisprudence,
reproductive autonomy and sex equality, and assesses their applicability to repro-
ductive genetic testing. Part III canvasses existing reasons-based abortion prohi-
bitions and explores the constitutional and practical challenges to their enforcement.
Despite potential arguments in favor of upholding some RBAPs, I argue that
RBAPs should be held unconstitutional to protect a woman's autonomy and bodily
integrity, to preserve the integrity of the physician-patient relationship, and to
avoid claims of state-supported eugenics. Part IV then examines the possibility of
state regulation of NIPD procedures. In Part IV, I propose a new framework for
analyzing Fourteenth Amendment challenges to regulations that limit access to
reproductive testing procedures rather than to abortion itself. The new framework
is based on intermediate scrutiny review with an exceedingly persuasive justifica-
tion23 rather than on the undue burden test applied to abortion regulations.2 4
This exceedingly persuasive justification standard will allow for a more nuanced
genetic characteristics in the Article as a shorthand for both genetic and chromosomal charac-
teristics.
20. CAROLINE WRIGHT, PHG FOUND., CELL-FREE FETAL NUCLEIC ACIDS FOR NON-
INVASIVE PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS: REPORT OF THE UK EXPERT WORKING GROUP 16
(2009), available at http://www.phgfoundation.org/file/5059 (stating that NIPD could be performed
as early as seven weeks from the start of the woman's last menstrual period).
21. SeeJack M. Balkin, How New Genetic Technologies Will Transform Roev. Wade, 56 EMORY L.J. 843,
844(2007).
22. For a more detailed discussion of NIPD technology and its capabilities, see Jaime S. King, And
Genetic Testing for All. . . The Coming Revolution in Non-invasive Prenatal Genetic Testing, 42
RUTGERS L.J. 599 (2011).
23. I refer to this framework as the "exceedingly persuasive justification" standard throughout the Article.
24. For a more detailed discussion of the undue burden standard, see infra notes 173-180 and accom-
panying text.
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balancing of the array of interests held by the state and the pregnant woman than
the undue burden test permits, while permitting state interference only in rare
cases. As part of this framework, I describe a new state interest that could justify
the state's ability to act to protect societal integrity when reliable evidence demon-
strates a discriminatory or otherwise harmful trend developing in NIPD practices
that a narrowly tailored government regulation could alleviate. Finally, I provide
three examples of how the exceedingly persuasive justification standard would
apply to regulations of NIPD.
I. NONINVASIVE PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS-
ATECHNOLOGICALADVANCE
Reproductive genetic testing, in a variety of forms, has been possible for over
forty years,25 but its use has been limited by the risks and discomfort associated
with diagnostic prenatal genetic testing, the timing of some procedures, the range
of conditions for which testing is appropriate, and the cost of the diagnostic test-
ing.26 NIPD, the most recent iteration of reproductive genetic testing, eliminates
many of these obstacles and thereby has the potential to increase both the number
of pregnant women having prenatal genetic tests and the genetic information for
which they are willing to test.27
A. The Limits of Current Prenatal Genetic Testing Technologies
The best way to understand the advantages of NIPD is to understand the
limitations of current reproductive genetic testing technologies. Most of the lim-
itations result from the difficulty of obtaining the fetal DNA required to perform
the genetic tests.28 Pregnant women can currently take one of three paths with
respect to prenatal genetic testing. First, they can forgo it all together. Women
who select this option may do so either because testing is financially or logistically
inaccessible, or because they know they would not abort the fetus for any reason
and would not want to spend their pregnancy worrying that their fetus is at elevated
risk for a genetic disorder. Second, pregnant women who know they want diag-
nostic information about their fetus as early as possible can opt to have chorionic
25. See Joseph Woo, A Short History of Amniocentesis, Fetoscopy and Chorionic Villus Sampling,
http://www.ob-ultrasound.net/amniocentesis.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2012).
26. See King, supra note 22, at 599.
27. For a more detailed discussion of the impact ofNIPD on prenatal testing, see id. at 599-602.
28. See Henry T. Greely, Get Readyfor the Flood ofFetal Gene Screening, 469 NATURE 289,289-90 (2011).
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villus sampling (CVS) from ten to fourteen weeks gestation.29 CVS is an invasive
procedure that uses a needle or a tube inserted through the cervix to retrieve fetal
cells from the placenta for genetic testing. The procedure costs around $1500, can
be uncomfortable for the woman, and has about a 1 percent risk of causing a mis-
carriage.30 Generally, women who choose to have CVS do so because they have a
family history of a genetic disorder or they are at advanced maternal age, which
places their fetus at elevated risk for Down syndrome and other disorders.
However, most pregnant women take the third path-prenatal genetic
screening, which provides them with risk information on whether the fetus will
have any of a handful of genetic disorders.3 Screening reveals only probabilities,
such as whether there is a one in thirteen, one in two hundred, or one in ten
thousand chance that the fetus will be born with the disorder. If a pregnancy
screens high risk, the mother will be offered amniocentesis.33 Prior to NIPD, the
most accurate prenatal screening protocol was sequential integrated screening,
which combines the results of a first trimester blood test, an ultrasound, and a
second trimester blood test to determine a fetus's risk.34 Even at its most accurate,
however, prenatal screening can give false negative results. To accommodate for
the error rate of the test, prenatal screening programs often create positive screen-
ing thresholds that are overinclusive to try to capture a majority of affected fetuses.
For instance, in some testing programs, women with a greater than one in 270 risk
29. See CAL. DEP'T OF PUB. HEALTH, THE CALIFORNIA PRENATAL SCREENING PROGRAM:
RESULTS FOR SCREENING IN THE FIRST TRIMESTER-THE RESULT OF YOUR BLOOD
SCREENING TEST IS: "SCREEN POSITIVE FOR DoWN SYNDROME" 4 (2009), available at
http://www.cdph.ca.gov/programs/pns/Documents/1T T21 PMS228 PRINT FINAL.pdf.
30. See Aaron B. Caughey et al., Chorionic Villus Sampling Compared WithAmniocentesis and theDjference
in the Rate of Pregnancy Loss, 108 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 612, 612-16 (2006). The
precise risk varies significantly with the provider's experience but can be as high as 3-5 percent. In
addition, in many geographic areas it is often difficult to find a provider who will perform a CVS
because of the malpractice risk.
31. See Shane W. Wasden et al., Are Age Cutoffs Still Used to Identify Candidates for Invasive Testingfor
ChromosomalAbnormalities, 56J. REPROD. MED. 113, 113 (2011).
32. Pregnancy Week by Week-h Prenatal Screening Right for You?, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayo
clinic.com/health/prenatal-testing/PROO014 (stating that prenatal screening has become routine in
most pregnancies) (last visited Sept. 15, 2012). The California Prenatal Screening Program, for
example, screens for open neural tube defects, abdominal wall defects, Down syndrome, Trisomy
18, and Smith-Lemli-Optiz Syndrome. Prenatal Screening Program, CAL. DEP'T PUB. HEALTH,
http://www.cdph.ca.gov/programs/pns/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Aug. 18, 2012). Other
programs may screen for fewer conditions.
33. CAL. DEPT OF PUB. HEALTH, supra note 29, at 7. During amniocentesis, the physician inserts a
needle through the pregnant woman's abdomen into the placenta to retrieve amniotic fluid, which
contains fetal DNA.
34. Prenatal Screening Program, supra note 32.
10
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of their fetus having Down syndrome will screen positive for the disorder." As a
result, the vast majority of women who screen positive for a specific condition will
not have an affected fetus.36 To know for sure, women with high-risk pregnancies
must undergo invasive prenatal diagnosis (IPD) via amniocentesis.
The decision to have amniocentesis is not always easy. If a fetus screens posi-
tive for a specific disorder, then the woman will likely receive genetic counseling
to help her determine whether she prefers to have an amniocentesis or wait until
the baby is born for diagnostic information. Like CVS, amniocentesis is an
uncomfortable, invasive procedure that has a risk of miscarriage between 0.13
percent and 1 percent. 37 Timing is also an issue. The earliest that sequential inte-
grated screening can be completed is fifteen to sixteen weeks gestation, well into
the second trimester. Once the results are available, the pregnant woman must
process the information and determine whether she wishes to terminate the preg-
nancy by twenty-four weeks gestation.
In sum, current prenatal diagnosis techniques are invasive, present a small
but not insignificant risk of miscarriage, and are most frequently performed in the
middle to end of the second trimester. Each of these factors limits the number of
women who receive genetic information through IPD and the reasons for which
they would test." First, the discomfort of the procedure and the risk of miscar-
riage may discourage many women from receiving any form of IPD unless a serious
genetic or chromosomal disorder runs in their family or they screen high risk for a
35. CAL. PAC. MED. CTR., INTEGRATED SCREENING FORDOWN SYNDROME (2007), available at
http://www.cpmc.org/learning/documents/intscreen-ws.pdf. Other programs do not consider
a woman to have screened positive until her risk is greater than one in one hundred. Letter From
San Francisco Perinatal Associates to author (June 1, 2009) (on file with author).
36. See Letter From San Francisco Perinatal Associates to author, supra note 35.
37. CAL. DEP'T OF PUB. HEALTH, supra note 29, at 7; see Caughey et al., supra note 30 (citing the
twenty-year risk of miscarriage with amniocentesis at 0.8 percent).
38. Most states determine viability to be around twenty-four to twenty-six weeks gestation, which is
measured from the first day of the woman's last menstrual period. However, nine states have re-
cently banned abortions at twenty-two weeks gestation on the basis of fetal pain, which will sig-
nificantly constrain a woman's ability both to receive prenatal screening, genetic counseling, and
amniocentesis and to make a termination decision prior to the legal cutoff for abortion. These laws
often count fetal weeks in terms of the date of conception, rather than gestation, which is more
commonly used in prenatal care. This would make these laws appear relevant to fetuses two weeks
earlier. ALA. CODE § 26-23B-5 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-141 (Supp.
2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-505 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-2-1
(LexisNexis 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6724 (Supp. 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1
(2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-3,106 (2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-745.5 (West Supp.
2011); Act of Apr. 12, 2012, ch. 250, § 7, 2012 Ariz. Legis. Serv. 995, 1007-08 (West) (to be
codified at ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 36-2159).
39. For a more detailed discussion of the limits that current prenatal testing protocols place on repro-
ductive genetic testing , see King, supra note 22, at 613-14.
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disease that would cause them to consider pregnancy termination.40 For some
women who screen positive, many ofwhom are older and toward the end of their
reproductive years, the risk of miscarriage is too high to proceed with IPD via
amniocentesis. 41 Second, the risk of amniocentesis also limits the range of condi-
tions for which physicians will offer IPD, as ethically they are required to weigh
the risks of the procedure against the informational benefits IPD provides.42
Third, all pregnant women may not have insurance coverage for IPD, making it
financially out of reach. Fourth, the timing ofboth CVS and amniocentesis would
require a woman seeking termination to have a surgical abortion rather than a
medical abortion.43 Moreover, abortions have greater risks and are more compli-
cated as the gestational age of the fetus increases.44 Finally, the majority of women
who opt for IPD via amniocentesis only after screening high risk would be con-
sidering an abortion at about eighteen to twenty-two weeks. At this point in the
pregnancy, when most woman are visibly pregnant and have told others of the
pregnancy, they are more likely to decide to test based on being at risk for severe
or life-threatening conditions, as many have decided to keep their pregnancies
barring extenuating circumstances. As a result, the timing might reduce the range
of conditions that women would test for through amniocentesis and the range of
conditions on which women would base their decisions to terminate the preg-
nancy.45 Indeed, in 2009, physicians performed invasive diagnostic prenatal
genetic testing on just under 2 percent of all fetuses.46
B. Noninvasive Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis
NIPD has the potential to alleviate many of the barriers to accessing diag-
nostic genetic information prenatally. About ten years ago, researchers discovered
40. "[M]ost women presenting for invasive prenatal testing ... are more likely to be those at high risk of
genetic disorders (as a result of prohibitive costs and other factors) ... ." Oladapo OT, Amniocentesis
and Chorionic Villus Sampling for Prenatal Diagnosis, WHO REPROD. HEALTH LIBR. (Apr. 1,
2009), http://apps.who.int/rhl/pregnancy-childbirth/fetal disorders/prenatal diagnosis/CDO0
3252_Oladapot com/en/index.html; see abo Antina de Jong et al., Non-invasive Prenatal Testing:
EthicallssuesExplored, 18 EUR.J. HUM. GENETICS. 272, 273-74 (2010).
41. See Wasden et al., supra note 31, at 115.
42. See Dagmar Schmitz et al., Commentary, No Risk, No Objections? Ethical Pifalls of Cell-Free Fetal
DNA andRNA Testing, 339 BRIT. MED.J. 165,165 (2009).
43. See Medical Versus Surgical Abortion, UCSF MED. CTR., http://www.ucsfhealth.org/adult/edu/
abortion.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2012).
44. A. Hall et al., Non-invasive PrenatalDiagnosis Uing Cell-Free Fetal DNA Technology: Applications
andImplications, 13 PUB. HEALTH GENOMICS 246,249 (2010).
45. See generally King, supra note 22, at 613-14.
46. See Greely, supra note 28, at 289.
12
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that a pregnant woman's blood also has fragments of DNA from the fetus she
carries.47 Collection and analysis of this cell-free fetal DNA (cffDNA) makes
NIPD possible. Currently, NIPD can be used as a highly accurate screening test
for fetal RhD blood typing, sex, paternity, and several chromosomal disorders,
including Down syndrome (Trisomy 21), Edwards syndrome (Trisomy 18), Patau
syndrome (Trisomy 13), and Turner Syndrome (Monosomy X).48 While NIPD
has been available for the past four years to determine fetal RhD blood typing and
sex, the recent availability of screening for chromosomal disorders marks a sub-
stantial step toward NIPD becoming the standard of care for a significant number
of pregnant women.49 NIPD for single-gene conditions, like Tay-Sachs disease
and cystic fibrosis, is not currently offered commercially, but it is likely to be
available in the next few years." In addition, the University of Washington re-
cently sequenced the entire fetal genome from a maternal blood sample, indicating
that whole fetal genome sequencing may be commercially available sometime in
the more distant future.s' In comparison to its predecessors, three features of
NIPD-its risks, timing, and cost-significantly distinguish it from current
prenatal genetic testing in ways that are likely to increase both the number of
women receiving prenatal genetic testing and the scope of conditions tested for.52
1. Risks
NIPD poses minimal risks to the mother and fetus. A lab technician can take
the blood sample required for NIPD at the same time as she draws blood for
47. Y.M. Dennis Lo et al., Material Plasma DNA Sequencing Reveals the Genome- Wide Genetic and
Mutationa/Profile oftheFetus, SCI. TRANSLATIONALMED., Dec. 8,2010, 61ra91, at 1, 1.
48. See MaterniT21 PLUS, SEQUENOM CTR. FOR MOLECULAR MED., http://www.sequeno
mcmm.com/home/health-care-professionals/trisomy-21/about-the-test (last visited Aug. 18,
2012); Patients Overview, VERINATA HEALTH, http://www.verinata.com/patients/patients-
overview (last visited Aug. 18, 2012); SensiGene FetalRHD Genotyping, SEQUIENOM CTR. FOR
MOLECULAR MED., http://www.sequenomcmm.com/home/health-care-professionals/fetal-rhd-
genotyping (last visited Aug. 18, 2012). A trisomy indicates that the fetus has three copies of
a particular chromosome. Therefore, a fetus with Trisomy 13 has three copies of the 13th chro-
mosome. Whereas, Monosomy X means the fetus has only one X chromosome, while normal
individuals are XX or XY.
49. For a detailed description ofNIPD's current and future potential, see generally King, supra note 22.
50. A. Bustamante-Aragon6s et al., Non-invasive Prenatal Diagnosis of Single-Gene Disorders From
MaternalBlood, 504 GENE 144 (2012) (discussing the progression of noninvasive prenatal diagnos-
tic testing that incorporates the analysis of single gene disorders with a paternal origin to incor-
porating maternally inherited fetal tracts in the future).
51. Jacob 0. Kitzman et al., Noninvasive Whole-Genome Sequencing of a Human Fetus, SC.
TRANSLATIONAL MED.,June 6,2012, 137ra76, at 1, 1.
52. King, supra note 22, at 620.
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numerous other pregnancy-related tests. NIPD for chromosomal abnormalities
is significantly more accurate than current prenatal screening techniques; therefore
fewer women will screen high risk. If fewer women screen high risk following
NIPD, then fewer women will be offered IPD and face the decision of risking a
miscarriage to receive diagnostic genetic test results.5 The lack of risk and near-
diagnostic accuracy associated with NIPD will change the calculus for receiving
prenatal genetic information for many women.5 While only 2 percent of women
nationwide elect to have IPD, in California, where physicians are required by law
to offer all pregnant women prenatal screening through a blood test, approxi-
mately 70 percent accept.s While California's data may overestimate the interest
in and availability of prenatal genetic testing nationally, this finding does demon-
strate pregnant women's willingness to undergo a blood test to find out genetic
information (even probabilistic information) about their fetus. As NIPD becomes
an integrated part of standard prenatal care, the number ofwomen receiving near-
diagnostic prenatal genetic information is likely to increase dramatically.s
53. See Lyn S. Chitty et al., Noninvasive Prenatal TestingforAneuploidy-Ready for Prime Time?, 206
AM.J. OBSTETRICS &GYNECOLOGY269, 272 (2012). In the future, it may be considered fully
diagnostic, such that IPD would not be necessary to validate the results.
54. Id.
55. See infra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
56. See Laura L. Jelliffe-Pawlowski et al., Using Second Trimester Ultrasound and Maternal Serum
Biomarker Data to Help Detect Congenital Heart Defects in Pregnancies With Positive Triple-Marker
Screening Results, 146A AM.J. MED. GENETICS 2455,2456 (2008).
57. Women may actually be more willing to have a noninvasive diagnostic test than a noninvasive screen-
ing test because of the need to verify a positive screening test with an invasive procedure, such as an
amniocentesis or CVS. See, e.g., Loes Kooij et al., TheAttitude ofWomen Toward CurrentandFuture
Possibilities ofDiagnostic Testing in Maternal Blood Using Fetal DNA, 29 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS
164,165-67 (2009).
58. See King, supra note 22, at 619-21. Current prenatal screening programs examine the presence of
hormones, proteins, and other markers of fetal DNA, but they do not currently examine the fetal
genome itself in the manner that IPD or NIPD do. See Quad Screen, AM. PREGNANCY ASS'N,
http://www.americanpregnancy.org/prenataltesting/quadscreen.html (last updated Sept. 2009).
The National Society of Genetic Counselors (NSGC) passed a position statement against the use
ofNIPD for Down syndrome and Trisomy 13 and 18 in low-risk pregnancy populations until studies
establish the accuracy of the tests in those populations. Once the tests are complete and if they
demonstrate similar levels of accuracy, NSGC anticipates that the tests will be used in all populations.
PATRICIA DEVERS, NAT'L SOC'Y OF GENETIC COUNSELORS, NONINVASIVE PRENATAL
TESTING/NONINVASIVE PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS: THE POSITION OF THE NATIONAL SOCIETY
OF GENETIC COUNSELORS (2012), available at http://www.nsgc.org/Portals/O/Advocacy/
NSGC Noninvasive Prenatal Testing 4-17-2012.pdf.
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NIPD's noninvasiveness will also broaden the range of conditions for which
prenatal testing is available and clinically appropriate. 9 As noted above, physicians
have an ethical obligation to balance any medical procedure's risks and benefits.60
Historically, the risk of miscarriage associated with IPD has limited prenatal
genetic testing to a small handful of severe disorders."1 The calculus changes
significantly, however, with NIPD because the blood test only creates a nominal
risk to the mother and almost no risk to the fetus. As a result, the vast majority of
information that can and will be available through NIPD, even if imperfect,
would outweigh the risks associated with a blood test.62 As our knowledge of ge-
netics improves and as NIPD use becomes integrated into prenatal care, little
prevents pregnant women and physicians from significantly widening the range
of prenatally identified diseases and conditions. Further, when fully commercial-
ized, whole genome analysis will permit fetal testing for hundreds of genetic
diseases, all chromosomal abnormalities, and predispositions to other multifacto-
rial conditions from a maternal blood sample." At that point, the scope of fetal
genetic information available through prenatal testing will be limited only by our
knowledge and understanding of genetics.
2. Timing
NIPD not only promises to expand the range of information available to
pregnant women, but it also lets them receive such information at a more useful
time, making NIPD results more actionable by increasing the number of options
available in a given situation.64 Scientists can detect fetal DNA in a maternal blood
sample as early as four weeks gestation and can currently use it for genetic testing
at ten weeks.6 s However, researchers have speculated that testing could theoreti-
59. de Jong et al., supra note 40, at 273; see abo Richard P. Smith et al., The Obstetricians View: Ethical
and Societal Implications ofNon-invasive Prenatal Diagnosis, 26 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 631, 633
(2006).
60. See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP &JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 166
(5th ed. 2001).
61. See Prenatal Testing, supra note 18.
62. See Smith et al., supra note 59.
63. See Lo et al., supra note 47, at 9; see also Kitzman et al., supra note 51, at 1.
64. See King, supra note 22, at 627-31.
65. S. Illanes et al., Early Detection ofCell-Free FetalDNA in Maternal Plasma, 83 EARLY HUM. DEV.
563, 565 (2007) (detecting cffDNA at four weeks gestation); see Press Release, Sequenom, Sequenom
Center for Molecular Medicine Announces Launch of Maternit2lTM Noninvasive Prenatal Test
for Down Syndrome (Oct. 17, 2011), http://sequenom.investorroom.com/index.php?s=43&
item=310.
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cally occur as early as seven weeks.66 Between seven and ten weeks, many women
will have only recently discovered the pregnancy and will have a greater range of
options open to them than they will at eighteen to twenty-four weeks. They will
have much more time to learn about life with an affected child and the resources
available to families caring for affected children.7 Increasing the amount of time
and information pregnant women have to make their decision may help them feel
more comfortable with their choices. Earlier diagnosis may also permit prenatal
treatment in the rare instances when it is possible or provide the parents with time
to prepare for their child's birth." Overall, possessing diagnostic information
earlier in a pregnancy can provide significant benefits for patients both clinically
and in their decisionmaking processes. 9
For those women who would consider termination, NIPD provides infor-
mation at a time when having an abortion may be more physically and emotionally
tolerable.70 Unlike current prenatal screening, NIPD would offer women a highly
accurate screen in the first trimester, which would enable women who screen
high risk to have confirmatory CVS in the first trimester or an amniocentesis early
in the second trimester. If the woman wanted to pursue pregnancy termination, a
surgical abortion would be required, but earlier abortions are safer and have fewer
complications. If in the future NIPD is considered diagnostic such that further
66. See, e.g., Hall et al., supra note 44, at 248.
67. In the hopes of providing improved information to pregnant women carrying fetuses with genetic
diseases and disorders, Congress recently passed the Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions
Awareness Act, Pub. L. No. 110-374, 122 Stat. 4051 (2008), which provides grants for par-
ticipating healthcare providers to furnish parents with "up-to-date information on the range of
outcomes for individuals living with the diagnosed condition, including physical, developmental,
educational, and psychosocial outcomes." Id § 3, 122 Star. at 4052 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 280g-
8(b)(1)(A)(ii)).
68. See Hall et al., supra note 44, at 248-49.
69. King, supra note 22, at 641-46. However, if pregnant women receive information they did not
intend to receive or were not properly informed about, NIPD could have significant negative con-
sequences, such as informing them of their own predisposition to having a genetic disorder. For a
discussion of this, see id. at 621-31, and Ananda van den Heuvel et al., Will the Introduction ofNon-
invasive Prenatal Diagnostic Testing Erode Informed Choices? An Experimental Study ofHealth Care
Professionah, 78 PATIENT EDUC. &COUNSELING 24,24 (2010).
70. This statement is a positive statement rather than a normative one. I do not mean to suggest that
women should find abortion more tolerable earlier on, just that some may. For an elegant descrip-
tion of the embryo's graduated status, see Margaret Olivia Little, Abortion and the Margins of
Personhood, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 331 (2008).
71. Surgical abortions in the first trimester are typically referred to in the United States as dilation and
curettage (D&C); however, they are typically performed via manual vacuum aspiration. In the
second trimester, surgical abortions are typically called either dilation and evacuation (D&E) or
dilation and extraction (D&X). See JENNIFER TEMPLETON DUNN ET AL., ABORTION IN
CALIFORNIA: A MEDICAL-LEGAL HANDBOOK 24, 31-34 (2012); see also Hall et al., supra note
16
HeinOnline  -- 60 UCLA L. Rev. 16 2012
Not This Child
confirmatory testing is not needed, a pregnant woman could have a medical
abortion in her own home, as opposed to a surgical abortion in a medical clinic,
up until nine weeks gestation.72 In either case, an earlier abortion may be more
tolerable emotionally." In the first trimester, pregnant women have had little
time to adjust to the idea of being pregnant and some may not feel that the fetus has
developed to the point of becoming a baby.74 Few have revealed their pregnancy
to many others and fewer still are physically showing. All of these factors may
make having an abortion less physically and psychologically difficult than it would
be in the middle or end of the second trimester when the woman is showing and
has been pregnant for several months.s By providing a wider range of genetic
information at an earlier point in the pregnancy, NIPD has the potential to
expand the number of conditions for which a pregnant woman would be willing
to engage in selective termination based on the genetic characteristics ofher fetus."
3. Cost
Finally, NIPD tests have the potential to cost significantly less than current
IPD testing protocols. However, as the cost of genetic sequencing decreases and
initial patents on noninvasive prenatal diagnostic testing techniques are successful-
ly challenged or expire, the relative cost of NIPD will also decrease, as it does not
require the clinical setting or expertise necessary to perform amniocentesis or CVS.n
44, at 249 (noting that terminating a pregnancy at an earlier gestation stage is safer as it reduces the risk
of complications and may allow for 'medical' (as opposed to surgical) methods of termination").
72. Medical Versus SurgicalAbortion, supra note 43. Medical abortions are caused by the administration
of medications that cause the uterine lining to shed. A woman may take these medications and abort
the fetus in her own home or in another nonmedical setting because medical abortions are nonin-
vasive and do not require anesthesia. Id.
73. See Little, supra note 70, at 342-43.
74. See Hall et al., supra note 44, at 249.
75. See id.; see also Priscilla K. Coleman et al., Late- Term ElectiveAbortion and Susceptibility to Posttraumatic
Stress Symptoms, 2010 J. PREGNANCY 1, 8, available at http://www.hindawi.com/journals/jp/2010/
130519.
76. A willingness to seek an abortion because of a particular condition does not necessarily imply an
ability to receive an abortion. Access to abortion remains a challenge for many women. To this end,
NIPD may increase the demand for abortion but not a woman's ability to receive one. See Kaiser
Family Found., Putting Womens'Health Disparities on the Map:Abortion Access, by State, 2008: %0 of
Women in Counties With NoAbortion Provider, STATEHEALTHFACTS.ORG, http://www.statehealth
facts.org/comparemapreport.jsp?rep= 8&cat=15&sortc=3&o= a (last visited Aug. 19,2012).
77. One of the earliest and most foundational patents covering NIPD technology will expire in 2018.
Non-invasive Prenatal Diagnosis, U.S. Patent No. 6,258,540 (filed Nov. 29, 1999). Numerous
patent challenges exist in this space and the intellectual property landscape is still in great flux.
Lauren C. Sayres et al., In the Public Interest?, Sc. TRANSLATIONAL MED., July 25, 2012,
144fs23, at 1, 1-2.
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For example, in 2008, Steve Quake, co-chair of the Stanford Bioengineering
Department and developer of the NIPD technology licensed to Verinata, esti-
mated that the cost to perform the sequencing needed for his aneuploidy test
would be approximately $700.78 By 2010, the cost of performing the test had
dropped nearly 60 percent to around $300. While the cost of performing
NIPD has fallen, the initial commercial price of NIPD mirrored the cost of IPD
at around $2000, but has already begun to decrease. In the fall of 2011,
Sequenom announced that the cost of its MaterniT21 for Down syndrome would
be $1900 to insurance companies, with a maximum out-of-pocket expense of
$235 per insured customer.s However in early 2012, Ariosa, another NIPD
start-up, introduced a substantially equivalent test, the Harmony Prenatal Test
for Trisomies 13, 18, and 21 to the commercial market for $795." As the cost of
conducting NIPD testing drops, the commercial cost to consumers is also quite
likely to continue to drop significantly in an effort to increase the volume ofwomen
undergoing the procedure.
By alleviating many of the problems associated with current prenatal genetic
testing, NIPD has the potential to dramatically change the way we think about
pregnancy, abortion, and reproductive rights in America. No single feature of
NIPD could independently bring about this change, but in combination the
results could be staggering.82 If the number of pregnant women receiving diag-
nostic genetic information about a wide range of genetic disorders and conditions
increases substantially, and their ability to terminate that pregnancy becomes
safer and easier, reproduction could be revolutionized.8 3 Each pregnancy could
become contingent upon NIPD test results at seven to ten weeks.
NIPD's introduction into prenatal care coincides with the growing state
interest in regulating the reasons for which a woman can have an abortion, which
78. Steve Quake, Presentation at Stanford Law School Conference on the Implications of Maternal
Serum Fetal Cell Free DNA (May 7,2010).
79. Id.
80. Andrew Pollack, A Less Risky Down Syndrome Test I Developed, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/18/business/sequenom-test-for-down-syndrome-raises-hopes-
and-questions.html.
81. See Erika Check Hayden, Fetal Tests SpurLegalBattle, 486 NATUJRE 454,454 (2012).
82. For an example of the kinds of societal results that are possible from widespread reproductive genetic
selection, see generally MARA HVISTENDAHL, UNNATURAL SELECTION: CHOOSING BOYS
OVER GIRLS, AND THE CONSEQUENCES OFA WORLD FULL OFMEN (2011).
83. For a detailed description of the factors that will determine NIPD's adoption into clinical care, see
King, supra note 22, at 620-25. A significant change in reproductive practices will depend on the
ability to access abortion, which is often a significant challenge for women in nonurban areas or
without the financial means to do so. Stephanie Mueller & Susan Dudley, Access to Abortion, NAT'L
ABORTION FED'N (2003), http://www.prochoice.org/about-abortion/facts/access-abortion.html.
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provides the ideal impetus to reconsider the bounds of reproductive autonomy and
the state's ability to regulate the factors that play into a pregnant woman's repro-
ductive decisions.
II. INTERPRETATIONS OF REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTSJURISPRUDENCE
Understanding the underlying justification for protecting reproductive rights
will help explicate whether and how those rights will respond to new technologies
like NIPD. Historically, the U.S. Supreme Court has justified Fourteenth
Amendment protection for reproductive rights, including the right to avoid
procreation and the right to procreate under certain circumstances, in terms of
the importance of both privacy and liberty in making personal and intimate
decisions.84 As technology has expanded the scope of intimate decisions a couple
could make related to reproduction and procreation, however, some scholars have
sought a justification for reproductive rights that provides more guidance on the
boundaries of those rights.ss One potential justification comes from a group
of leading abortion scholars who have argued since Roe in favor of justifying
reproductive rights in terms of sex equality-in other words, protecting a woman's
ability to maintain an equal social and economic status with men." This justifi-
cation allows a regulatory line to be drawn that protects women's interests in rights
to contraception and abortion, but permits state regulation of technologies that do
not necessarily have a gender-specific impact, such as reproductive cloning.
This Part briefly explores the history of these two approaches to reproductive
rights in order to lay the groundwork for analyzing their implications with respect
to reasons-based abortion prohibitions and reasons-based information prohi-
bitions.
84. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992).
85. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 21, at 843-45; Sonia M. Suter, The "Repugnance" Lens of Gonzales v.
Carhart and Other Theories ofReproductive Rights: Evaluating AdvancedReproductive Technologies, 76
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1514,1517-20 (2008).
86. See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade (1983), in
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 93 (1987); Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Essay, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375
(1985); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984);
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality UnderLaw, 100 YALE LJ. 1281 (1991); Reva
B. Siegel, Abortion as a Sex Equality Right: Its Basis in Feminist Theory, in MOTHERS IN LAW:
FEMINIST THEORYAND THE LEGAL REGULATION OF MOTHERHOOD 43 (Martha Albertson
Fineman & Isabel Karpin eds., 1995) [hereinafter Siegel, Abortion as a Sex Equality Right]; Reva
Siegel, Reasoning From the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of
EqualProtection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992) [hereinafter Siegel, Reasoning From the Body].
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A. Privacy and Liberty
The Supreme Court has justified granting Fourteenth Amendment due pro-
cess protection to decisions regarding reproduction and procreation on both pri-
vacy and liberty grounds. Initially, the Court focused its substantive due process
analysis on the privacy and intimacy of reproductive decisions, but in more recent
years, the Court's substantive due process language has shifted to focus more on
an individual's liberty interest in making intimate decisions." Regardless of the
justification, the Court has held repeatedly that the Due Process Clause protects
an individual's right to make intimate, personal decisions regarding whether to
submit to certain medical treatments;" whether, when, and with whom to have
children; 0 and how to raise those children free from unwarranted government
intervention.91 These protected decisions fall into one of three categories: procre-
ative, personal, and parental.92 For instance, laws that restrict access to abortion,
like RBAPs, will impinge on a woman's procreative liberty. Laws that restrict
access to NIPD tests or to other forms of assisted reproduction, however, are likely
to implicate other liberty interests as well. This Subpart discusses procreative
liberty as it relates to direct restrictions on abortion, and Part IV considers personal
and parental liberty during the discussion of reasons-based testing prohibitions.
87. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 n.13 (1973) ("[T]he constitutionally protected
privacy of family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child rearing is not just concerned with a
particular place, but with a protected intimate relationship."); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153
(1972) (stating that the right to privacy is "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether
or not to terminate her pregnancy"); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (extending the
right to utilize contraception to nonmarried persons and making it an individual right as opposed to
one based in the marital relationship by reasoning that "[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is
the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so findamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child").
88. Thomas Cocker, From Pduacy to Liberty. The FourthAmendmentAfter Lawrence, 57 UCLA L. REV.
1, 10 (2009) (noting that in the areas of marriage and procreation, "the Court has shifted signifi-
cantly away from further development of privacy protections in favor of protecting a realm of per-
sonal and interpersonal liberty grounded in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments"). As a result of the change in the Courfts language, I will discuss substantive due
process protection for one's ability to make private and intimate decisions regarding reproduction
and family in terms of a liberty interest, but it is my intent to capture rights justified under both
interests.
89. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-80 (1990).
90. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847-50 (1992).
91. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
92. Radhika Rao, Constitutional Misconceptions, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1473, 1488-89 (1995) (reviewing
JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES (1994)) (describing these categories of interests in terms of privacy of procreation,
privacy of person, and privacy of parenting).
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Since Roe, legal scholars and judges have concluded that the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause protects a woman's liberty to decide to have
an abortion prior to viability, regardless of her reason." Under this liberty-based
approach, constitutional protection attaches to the decision to abort, and a woman's
reason for making the decision is entirely secondary. This approach relies on an
interpretation of the Supreme Court's decisions in Roe and Casey that is based on
a "highly individualistic, libertarian theory of autonomy and privacy."9 A strong
theory ofreproductive privacy and liberty would grant prospective parents extensive
control over their reproductive lives by protecting them against state interference
in all important and intimate reproductive decisions.s
As science and technology expand the scope of potential reproductive tech-
nologies, a liberty-based theory of reproductive rights could protect everything
from a decision to use birth control to a decision to engage in reproductive cloning
or genetic engineering of one's children."6 Over the last three decades, John
Robertson, a leading legal scholar on reproductive rights, has developed and ap-
plied his theory of procreative liberty, which is grounded in strong notions of priv-
acy and autonomy, to a wide range of reproductive decisions and technologies."7
93. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1972) ('With respect to the State's important and legitimate
interest in potential life, the 'compelling' point is at viability."); Casey, 505 U.S at 860 (describing
Roe's "central holding, that viability marks the earliest point at which the State's interest in fetal life is
constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions"); John A. Robertson,
Genetic Selection ofOffspring Characteristics, 76 B.U. L. REV. 421, 427 (1996).
94. Suter, supra note 85, at 1520.
95. See id.; fBalkin, supra note 21, at 858 (noting that a strong conception of reproductive privacy "may
increase the personal liberties ofparents").
96. Balkin, supra note 21, at 856. For an excellent analysis of the implications for a procreative liberty
and personal autonomy theory based on a range of reproductive technologies, see Suter, supra note
85, at 1520-40.
97. ROBERTSON, supra note 92, at 24; John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of
Conception, Pregnancy and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REv. 405 (1983); John A. Robertson, Embryos,
Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV.
939 (1986); John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty, Embryos, and Collaborative Reproduction: A
Legal Perspective, 13 WOMEN & HEALTH 179 (1987); John A. Robertson, Liberalism and the
Limits ofProcreative Liberiy:A Response to My Critics, 52 WASH. &LEE L. REv. 233 (1995); John
A. Robertson, Reproductive Liberty and the Right to Clone Human Beings, 913 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD.
SCI. 198 (2000); John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty in the Era of Genomics, 29 AM. J.L. &
MED. 439, 445 (2003) [hereinafter Robertson, Era of Genomics]; John A. Robertson, Procreative
Liberty and Harm to Offspring in Assisted Reproduction, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 7 (2004); John A.
Robertson, Assisting Reproduction, Choosing Genes, and the Scope ofReproductive Freedom, 76 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 1490 (2008); John A. Robertson, Abortion and Technology: Sonograms, Fetal Pain,
Viability and Early Prenatal Diagnosis, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 327 (2011) [hereafter Robertson,
Abortion and Technology].
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Robertson argues broadly in favor of protecting "the freedom to decide whether or
not to have offspring and to control the use of one's reproductive capacity.""
Recognizing that an entirely unbridled approach to reproductive rights
would permit not only genetic selection but also genetic manipulation to enhance
or diminish a child's genetic capacity, Robertson argues for limits on reproductive
choice based on the core goals and values of reproduction." Accordingly, he ar-
gued that "procreative liberty would protect only actions designed to enable a
couple to have normal, healthy offspring whom they intend to rear."100 These
limits, however, present few-if any-restrictions on the use of NIPD to inform
selective abortion decisions. Robertson argues that "[i]f abortion is accepted
generally, then it should be available for genetic selection reasons as well."o
Accordingly,
the question is simply whether choice of [a nonmedical characteristic] is
so centrally implicated with the decision whether or not to reproduce
that it should receive presumptive protection as an exercise of procreative
freedom. For some parents, choice of [a nonmedical characteristic] will
be central to reproductive choice, and therefore presumptively protected
against restriction without showing of compelling need.'02
Robertson acknowledges that, in some instances, a woman's reason for deciding to
terminate might be so trivial as to be outside procreative liberty,103 but attempts
to draw those lines have been largely unfruitful.
In his earlier discussion of more trivial nonmedical traits like eye and hair
color, Robertson noted that few parents would undergo invasive prenatal diag-
nosis to selectively abort on the basis of these traits, but forecasting the future, he
suggested that prospective parents might be more willing to use a less burdensome
preconceptive method if it were available.104 Therefore, "some choices over
nonmedical traits might also qualify for presumptive protection, because the person
seeking such information would base a reproductive decision on it."10 Overall, a
98. ROBERTSON, supra note 92, at 16.
99. Id. at 167. Enhancement would entail modifying an individual's DNA to improve his or her abilities
beyond normal species functioning, while intentional diminishment would involve genetic manipu-
lation to reduce an individual's capacity to below-normal species functioning. See generally Norman
Daniels, Normal Functioning and the Treatment-Enhancement Distinction, 9 CAMBRIDGE Q
HEALTHCARE ETHICS 309 (2000).
100. ROBERTSON, supra note 92, at 167.
101. Id. at 159.
102. Robertson, supra note 91, at 434 (using the example of nonmedical sex selection).
103. Id. at 431-32.
104. Id. at 435.
105. Id.
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theory of reproductive rights based on strong notions of privacy and autonomy, like
Robertson's, would give prospective parents substantial leeway to engage in any
activity or access any information that they could plausibly argue was determinative
of their decision to reproduce.
As a result, the liberty-based theory has drawn criticism for its potential
boundlessness."o6 Radhika Rao has argued that "procreative liberty appears to
possess no logical stopping point, expanding to the outer limits of technological
possibility and human ingenuity."107 Similarly, Jack Balkin has argued that a
liberty-based approach to reproductive rights may create a broad overarching
right to reproductive autonomy, protecting parents' right to make any decision
related to "when and how to have offspring."'o With respect to NIPD and selec-
tive abortion, a purely liberty-based approach could protect selective abortion
based on any NIPD result that was arguably related to a parent's reproductive
decisionmaking, as well as the ability to access any NIPD test that would inform
those decisions. Robertson has not entirely adopted a pure liberty-based approach.
He acknowledges that the right to procreative liberty is not "absolute," and instead
argues that there is a strong presumption in its favor that should only be overcome
when the reproductive activity poses a significant harm to others.1o' So far,
however, Robertson has found very few reproductive activities that he believes
might be subject to limitation, arguing instead for protecting prospective parents'
ability to engage in a wide range of reproductive activities that leaves other scholars
concerned." 0 Despite its potential boundlessness, the Court has largely continued
to analyze restrictions on abortion in terms of substantive due process protection
for procreative liberty, though notions of equality have begun to play a larger role
as well.
B. Equality
A theory of reproductive rights that incorporated notions of equality as well
as procreative liberty could be used to define more clearly the scope of consti-
106. E.g., Balkin, supra note 21, at 856; Rao, supra note 92, at 1479-81 &n.17; see also Suter, supra note
85, at 1538-40 (recognizing the potential limitlessness of "only the most liberal conception" of
procreative liberty).
107. Rao, supra note 92, at 1479.
108. Balkin, supra note 21, at 858.
109. Robertson, supra note 91, at 428-29.
110. Id. at 432 (suggesting that decisions to engage in reproductive cloning by fertile women and inten-
tional diminishment-that is, genetic manipulation to reduce a child's abilities-might be outside
ofprocreative-liberty protection).
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tutional abortion protection."' Although Roe was decided on substantive due
process grounds without mention of equality for women, even at that time
equality concerns were implicit in the Court's reasoning." 2 The Court's justifica-
tion for protecting abortion stemmed largely from the impositions placed on a
woman by the pregnancy, birth, and rearing of an unwanted child."3 This
impositions-based language is more consistent with an approach based on procre-
ative liberty and equality between the sexes than one based on the expectation of
privacy and the intimacy of the decision to reproduce. The relative burden of an
unwanted child will affect a woman's ability to engage in social and economic ac-
tivities, but it has no bearing on the intimate and personal nature of an abortion
decision or the private nature of the relationship between prospective parents or a
pregnant woman and her doctor.
In the 1980s and early 1990s, scholarship on the use of sex equality arguments
to further reproductive rights expanded significantly with works by Sylvia Law,
Justice Ginsburg, Catharine MacKinnon, and Reva Siegel." 4 In 1985, then-
Judge Ginsburg argued in a widely cited article that the conflict over abortion
is not simply one between a fetus' interests and a woman's interests,
narrowly conceived, nor is the overriding issue state versus private
control of a woman's body for a span of nine months. Also in the bal-
ance is a woman's autonomous charge of her full life's course- . . . her
ability to stand in relation to man, society, and the state as an indepen-
dent, self-sustaining, equal citizen.115
In 1992, the Casey Court affirmatively acknowledged sex equality, along with
procreative liberty, as a justification for affirming the right to abortion."' The
Court stated that "[tjhe ability of women to participate equally in the economic
and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their
111. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 21, at 864; Ginsburg, supra note 86, at 382-83; Reva B. Siegel, Sex
EqualityArgumentsforReproductive Rights: Their CriticalBasis andEvolving ConstitutionalExpression,
56 EMORY LJ. 815, 818-19 (2007); Siegel, Abortion as a Sex Equality Right, supra note 86; Siegel,
Reasoning From the Body, supra note 86.
112. See Linda Greenhouse, How the Supreme Court TalksAboutAbortion: The Implications ofa Shifting
Discourse, 42 SUFFOLKU. L. REV. 41,45-46,51-53 (2008) (noting that the Supreme Court in Roe
was presented with numerous briefs that presented the right to abortion in terms of equality and that
although the Court did not adopt that framework, similar language regarding equality began to
appear again in the legal literature and in Supreme Court decisions in the 1980s and 1990s).
113. See Ginsburg, supra note 86, at 382-83; Siegel, Reasoning From the Body, supra note 86, at 273-74.
114. See supra note 86.
115. Ginsburg, supra note 86, at 383 (footnote omitted) (citing Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword, Equal
Citizenship Under the FourteenthAmendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 57-59 (1977)).
116. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852, 856 (1992); see Greenhouse, supra note
112, at 53.
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reproductive lives.""' Justice Stevens further argued in his concurring and dissent-
ing opinion that the costs of overruling Roe would be "enormous" because "Roe is
an integral part of a correct understanding of both the concept of liberty and the
basic equality of men and women."'
In the years since Casey, the equality-based approach to reproductive rights
has gained significant ground in the legal literature,"' but it, along with procrea-
tive liberty, was substantially weakened by the Court's decision in Gonzales v.
Carhart.'20 The Carhart Court upheld the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act
that prohibited the provision of a specific kind of late-term abortion, known as a
"partial-birth abortion," and notably did not include an exception to protect the
health of the pregnant woman.'2 ' In doing so, the five-to-four majority moved
away from the ideas that the right to abortion was inherent in women's ability to
determine their own destiny and that it allowed them to remain on equal footing
with men in society, and instead moved toward concerns of "coarsening society"
and a paternalistic desire to protect women from making uninformed abortion
decisions.'2 2 Equality arguments, however, survived injustice Ginsburg's dissent,
joined by Justices Breyer, Souter, and Stevens, as a justification for overturning
the law.123
Under a solely equality-based framework, reproductive activities that would
not threaten women's equality would not receive constitutional protection.124
Framing the issue in terms ofwomen's equality permits distinctions between pro-
117. Casey, 505 U.S. at 856.
118. Id at 912 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
119. See, e.g., Jennifer S. Hendricks, Body and Soul Equality, Pregnancy, and the Unitary Right toAbortion,
45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 329 (2010); Reva B. Siegel, Lecture, The Right's Reasons: Constitutional
Conflict and the Spread of Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE LJ. 1641 (2008);
Jeannie Suk, The Trajectory of Trauma: Bodies and Minds ofAbortion Discourse, 110 COLUM. L.
REv. 1193 (2010).
120. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
121. Id. at 163-64 (holding that because both sides provided medical testimony regarding the existence
of health risks to the pregnant woman from partial-birth abortion procedures and because "[t]he
Court has given state and federal legislatures wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is
medical and scientific uncertainty," no health exception was required).
122. Id. at 157-60; see abo Greenhouse, supra note 112, at 55; Suter, supra note 85, at 1581-83 (describing
the lens used by the Court in Carhart as one of "repugnance" because its decisions seemed to be based
on a general disgust with the procedure).
123. Carhart, 550 U.S at 171-72 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In fact, the dissent interprets Casey almost
exclusively through the lens of sex equality rather than one of procreative liberty.
124. See Balkin, supra note 21, at 857-61.
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tected and unprotected reproductive activities to be drawn more clearly.125 Balkin,
a strong proponent of the equality interpretation, has argued that the abortion
right should be "designed to help secure women's equal citizenship in a world in
which reproductive burdens and the life-altering obligations of parenthood fall
particularly heavily on them."126 He also noted that viewing the abortion right in
terms of equality would permit the state to regulate new reproductive technologies
in ways that might not be possible under procreative liberty.127
Both the liberty-based framework and the equality-based framework have
support in the academic literature and in Supreme Court precedent. While the
majonty opinion in Carhart weakened arguments favoring both autonomy and
equality by upholding a law that banned a previability abortion procedure without
a health exception, it appeared to do so evenly, prioritizing ethical and moral con-
cerns. Moreover, if Justice Ginsburg's dissent provides a valid indicator of the
opinions of her fellow dissenting justices, it may indicate a shift toward granting
sex equality concerns more priority in reproductive rights jurisprudence. As a re-
sult, analyzing how both approaches would apply to new state laws restricting
access to abortions sought for a specific reason and potential laws that would
restrict access to the genetic tests that would inform selective abortion decisions is
important to developing a full understanding of the impact NIPD can have on
reproductive rights.
III. REASONS-BASEDABORTION PROHIBITIONS
In an effort to reduce the number of abortions, a handful of states have
passed legislation that restricts access to abortion based on the woman's reason for
electing to terminate.'28 By expanding the range of genetic tests available, NIPD
will dramatically increase the number of factors that parents can consider in decid-
ing whether to go forward with a pregnancy. Further, by providing genetic infor-
125. See Ginsburg, supra note 86, at 382-83; Karst, supra note 115, at 53-59 (linking abortion prohi-
bitions with discrimination against women and stating that the issue in Roe concerned "women's
position in society in relation to men").
126. Balkin, supra note 21, at 856.
127. See id. at 856-57.
128. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.02 (West Supp. 2011); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
510/6(8) (West 2010) ("No person shall intentionally perform an abortion with knowledge that the
pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely on account of the sex of the fetus."); Statistical
Reporting of Abortion Act, H.B. 1595, 52d Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2009) (prohibiting the
performance of an abortion solely on account of the sex of the unborn child); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 3204(c) (West 2000) ("No abortion which is sought solely because of the sex of the unborn
child shall be deemed a necessary abortion."); see also AMERICANS UNITED FOR LIFE, supra note 4.
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mation to prospective parents in time to have a medical or early surgical abortion,
NIPD may alter couples' justifications for engaging in selective abortion. At the
same time, states may be eager to pass legislation prohibiting access to abortion
for many of these newfound reasons in an effort to restrict the scope of available
abortions firther. This Part describes the existing reasons-based abortion prohi-
bitions and then examines them under substantive due process and equal protec-
tion analyses. I conclude that while the incorporation of equal protection argu-
ments would facilitate distinguishing which genetic conditions the state could
regulate, those lines are better left undrawn. Such regulations may increase dis-
crimination against disabled individuals and their families and ultimately have a
negative impact on society. In contrast, using the more expansive liberty-based
framework for regulations that directly touch abortion would accomplish the
equal protection goals in terms of protecting a woman's ability to maintain equal-
ity with men without the potential for increased discrimination and state evalua-
tion of the speculative burden that some citizens place on others.
A. State Legislation
Historical interest in reasons-based abortion prohibitions has been limited.
Before 2009, only two states, Pennsylvania and Illinois, had passed laws prohibit-
ing physicians from providing abortions based on the mother's reason for wanting
it. 129 Both states proscribed physicians from performing abortions they knew were
sought based on the fetus's sex.'30 However, state interest has picked up substan-
tially. In the last three years, U.S. Congress and eight state legislatures have
received bills that propose reasons-based abortion bans.' 3' Two states, Oklahoma
and Arizona, successfully passed such measures.132
129. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3204(c) (West 2000) ("No abortion which is sought solely
because of the sex of the unborn child shall be deemed a necessary abortion."); 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 510/6(8) (West 2010) ("No person shall intentionally perform an abortion with
knowledge that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely on account of the sex of the
fetus."). Pennsylvania's law was amended to include this provision in 1989, and Illinois's was passed
before 1985. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3204; 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 510/6.
130. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3204(c); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 510/6(8).
131. See Susan B. Anthony and Frederick Douglass Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act, H.R. 1822, 111th
Cong. (2009); S.B. 529, 150th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2010); A.B. 162,214th Leg., 1st Sess. (NJ.
2010); H.B. 484, 187th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2011); H.B. 693, 60th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho
2010); H.F. 1196, 86th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2009); S.F. 1073, 2009 Leg., 86th Sess. (Minn.
2009); S.B. 5033, 234th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2011); A.B. 7610, 234th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2011);
H.B. 5530, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (RI. 2011), S.B. 336 2011 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (RI. 2011).
132. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-731.2 (West 2004 & Supp. 2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
3603.02.
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Oklahoma has recently passed two pieces of legislation that reveal a growing
interest in a woman's reasons for choosing an abortion. In the first, Oklahoma pro-
hibits any provider from performing "an abortion with knowledge that the preg-
nant female is seeking the abortion solely on account of the sex of the unborn
child."133 The statute, however, specifically permits the performance of a sex-
selective abortion sought because the unborn child has an elevated risk of develop-
ing a sex-linked genetic disease.134 The act grants the woman on whom the
abortion was performed (or her parents, if she is an unemancipated minor) the right
to sue the provider for actual and punitive damages that arise from the perfor-
mance of a sex-selective abortion.'35 In addition, it permits a claim for injunctive
relief to be brought by the attorney general, a district attorney, the woman on
whom the abortion was attempted or performed, or "any person who is the spouse,
parent, sibling, or guardian of, or current or former licensed health care provider of,
the female upon whom an abortion has been performed," providing a wide array
of individuals who have standing to sue the abortion provider.' 6
The second Oklahoma law requires providers to ask every woman seeking an
abortion, in the absence of a medical emergency, to answer questions about her
reasons for doing so either orally or in writing.' 7 The provider must then include
the reason given or note the woman's refusal to answer in The Individual Abortion
Form, which providers are required to send to the state for each abortion they
perform."' The Individual Abortion Form lists over forty reasons why a woman
might seek an abortion and encourages providers to "check all applicable" rea-
sons.139 Most of the suggested reasons focus on the mother's financial and rela-
tionship status, but two focus on characteristics of the fetus: "Mother wanted a
child of a different sex," and "There may be [a] possible problem affecting the health
133. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-731.2(B).
134. Id. Physicians first performed sex-selective abortions to avoid the birth of male offspring to women
who carried an X-linked disorder. If a woman is a carrier of an X-linked disorder, her male fetuses
are at higher risk of having an X-linked disorder than her female fetuses because they only receive
one copy of the X chromosome. Each male fetus has a fifty-fifty chance of receiving the affected X
allele from a carrier mother and thus a fifty-fifty chance of contracting the disorder. Their sisters,
who would receive two copies of the X chromosome, would have a fifty-fifty chance of being
carriers, but almost no risk of having the disorder. Sex-LinkedRecessiveDisorders, MEDLINE PLUS,
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/artide/002051.htm (last updated May 16, 2012).
135. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-731.2(C)(4).
136. Id. § 1-731.2(C)(1). The injunction is intended to prohibit the provider from performing any addi-
tional abortions in violation of this statute. Id. § 1-731.2(C)(2).
137. Id. § 1-738k(F)(15).
138. Id § 1-738k.
139. Id § 1-738k(F)(15).
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of the fetus."'40 To date, Oklahoma is the only state that has passed legislation that
specifically asks women to state their reasons for seeking an abortion.
In 2011, Arizona passed the Susan B. Anthony and Frederick Douglass
Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act,141 which made it a class three felony to provide
an abortion with knowledge that the woman sought it "based on the sex or race of
the child or the race of a parent of that child," and which requires the provider to
sign an affidavit to that effect.'42 The Act also makes it a felony to use force to
coerce a woman into having a sex- or race-based abortion, or to solicit or accept
money to finance such an abortion.'43 The Act grants the attorney general, the
father of the unborn child, or the maternal grandparents, if the mother is under
the age of eighteen, standing to sue on behalf of the unborn child.'44 A pregnant
woman who seeks or has a sex- or race-selective abortion, however, cannot be
subjected to criminal or civil penalties.145
In each instance above, a state has used the legislative process to restrict or
receive information on the reasons for which a woman seeks to have an abortion.
While the reasons-based abortion legislation has focused on sex and race so far, it
seems unlikely to stop there. Americans United for Life (AUL), a major pro-life
nonprofit organization, made reasons-based abortion prohibitions a significant
focus of their 2011 legislative strategy and produced model legislation and a policy
guide on banning abortions for sex selection and genetic abnormalities.146 In the
spring of 2012, the Missouri state legislature introduced a bill styled after AUL's
model legislation that would prohibit abortions sought for sex or any genetic con-
dition of the fetus.147 As NIPD offers prospective parents more information about
140. Id.
141. H.B. 2443, 50th Leg., 1st Sess. (Ariz. 2011).
142. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.02(A)(1) (West Supp. 2011); id. § 36-2157. It is important to
note that race is not something that can be tested genetically, rather, it can be considered a social
construct. See Audrey Smedley & Brian D. Smedley, Race as Bioloy Is Fiction, Racism as a Social
Problem Is Real: Anthropological and Historical Perspectives on the Social Construction of Race, AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST, Jan. 2005, at 16, 16-26 (presenting evidence that demonstrates racial groups are
not genetically discrete, reliably measured, or scientifically meaningful); see also Ian F. Haney
L6pez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 7 (1994) (defining race as groupings ofpeople based loosely on various
components, including social, ancestral, and physical commonalities); Richie Witzig, The
Medicalization ofRace: ScientficLegitimization ofa Flawed Social Construct, 125 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 675, 675-79 (1996) ("Race is ... an unscientific social construct....").
143. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.02(A)(2)-(3).
144. Id. § 13-3603.02(B)-(C).
145. Id. § 13-3603.02(E).
146. AMERICANS UNITED FOR LIFE, supra note 4.
147. Abortion Ban for Sex Selection and Genetic Abnormalities Act of 2012, H.B. 1933, 96th Gen.
Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2012).
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the genes of their fetuses, pro-life organizations and other entities are likely to
encourage legislators to expand the range of conditions for which abortion is
deemed inappropriate, thereby limiting the availability of abortion. Reasons-based
abortion prohibitions are well poised to face constitutional challenges as they
place a direct obstacle in the path ofwomen seeking previability abortions. In some
cases, creating the impetus for a constitutional challenge may have been the intent
of those drafting the legislation.148 While a facial constitutional challenge to these
laws has not yet been brought, an analysis of the constitutionality of reasons-based
abortion prohibitions is overdue.
B. Fourteenth Amendment Challenges
As use of NIPD expands and offers prospective parents more information on
which to make termination decisions, the Supreme Court will inevitably be asked
to further define the scope of the abortion right. Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court has long been opaque on how the boundaries of Fourteenth Amendment
protection would change in response to technological advances and cultural
norms.149 According to existing doctrine, states may regulate abortion-related
activities in two situations: (1) when the state regulation restricts an activity or deci-
sion that is not protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, so long as the regula-
tion is rationally related to a legitimate state interest, and (2) when the state
regulation does not place an undue burden on a woman's ability to make protect-
ed decisions free from government interference.so In this Subpart, I analyze the
liberty- and equality-based frameworks for defining abortion rights through the lens
of the constitutional issues raised by NIPD and RBAPs.
In analyzing the ability of a state to pass and enforce RBAPs, the first step is
to determine whether a woman has a constitutionally protected right to seek an
abortion for any reason-an issue the Court has not yet considered."' This is an es-
pecially thorny issue, with the potential to change our understanding of repro-
148. See Kathy Lohr, Oklahoma Abortion Law 'Invasive,' Critics Say, NPR.ORG (Dec. 17, 2009),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=121536729. Interestingly, no challenge,
other than the single subject rule challenge, which is a procedural challenge raised against legis-
lation that has more than one subject, has been brought to reasons-based abortion prohibitions, po-
tentially because pro-choice supporters do not want to send the issue up to the Roberts Court at
this time.
149. See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1117, 1154 (2002) (con-
sidering how technology may affect the right to privacy in numerous contexts including repro-
duction).
150. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
151. Cf Cass R. Sunstein, Is There a ConstitutionalRight o Clone?, 53 HASTINGS LJ. 987,989 (2002).
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ductive rights.152 The Supreme Court must first decide how to frame the right in
question, and then, ifa right exists, decide how far to extend Fourteenth Amendment
protection. In this Subpart, I argue that the Court should frame the issue broadly
to consider selective abortion as part of the existing right to make an abortion
decision and then argue that Fourteenth Amendment protection should extend
to all reasons for seeking an abortion.
1. A Right to Selective Abortion
Whether a citizen has a fundamental right to engage in a certain activity
often depends on how the Supreme Court frames the analysis.5 3 The Court's
recent substantive due process cases tend to frame issues in two different ways-
either as new, independent fundamental rights or as parts of existing rights. 154
Prenatal genetic testing and selective abortion can be framed as either a new fun-
damental right to genetic selection via abortion or as part of the existing right to
freedom from unwarranted governmental interference in intimate personal deci-
sions related to reproduction and sexuality.
Framed as a new fundamental reproductive right-the right to abort children
based on any genetic or chromosomal characteristic-the claim for Fourteenth
Amendment due process protection seems unlikely. Justice Rehnquist's opinion
in Washington v. Glucksberg55 established a traditionalist framework for deciding
if an activity qualified for due process protection based on whether the activity
was "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."56 This framing requires
a "careful description" of the asserted fundamental interest so as to restrain
152. See Robertson, Abortion and Technology, supra note 97, at 370 (arguing that NIPD has the
"potential to wreak havoc with understandings of abortion and abortion rights"); see also Arthur
Caplan, Fetal Genetic Testing: A Troubling Technology, MSNBC.COM (Aug. 9, 2011, 4:16 PM),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/44078722/ns/health-health-care/t/fetal-genetic-testing-
troubling-technology (stating that NIPD is "likely to reshape the debate over abortion").
153. See Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Leveh of Generality in the Defnition ofRights, 57 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1057, 1058 (1990). Compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), with
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (highlighting the different ways that a "fundamental
right" can be framed by the Court with Griswold focusing on the intimacy and private nature of the
marital bedroom and Eisenstadt focusing on the individual's procreative right to privacy-both in
an effort to protect the right to utilize contraception), Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
710 (1997) (framing the issue by questioning whether the right to die by physician assisted suicide
is a fundamental liberty), Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), and Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
154. See Sunstein, supra note 151, at 989; see also Suter, supra note 85, at 1520-56, 1569-92.
155. 521 U.S.702.
156. Id. at 721 (quoting Moore v. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (upholding a ban on physician-assisted suicide).
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expansion of Due Process Clause protection.57 Given prenatal genetic testing's
relative recency, the vast improvements in our understanding and knowledge of
genetics, and the testing improvements offered by NIPD, one would find it hard
to argue that such a right on its own was deeply rooted in our nation's history and
traditions.
However, Rehnquist's historical lens may not be as clear as it seems. Cass
Sunstein has demonstrated that many of the cases that originally defined the sub-
stantive due process right to privacy in decisions surrounding reproduction and
sexuality would also fail Glucksberg's traditionalism test.58 Prior to Roe, there was no
clear tradition that permitted abortion.5 ' Prior to Eisenstadt v. Baird,16 0 there was
no longstanding acceptance of contraceptive use outside of marriage.'6 ' Lawrence
v. Texas'62 did not vindicate a historical tradition of privacy and liberty in all adult
sexual relations. These activities are representative, however, of the kinds of
broader traditional interests that the Court has historically protected by establish-
ing substantive due process rights, such as preserving autonomy and liberty in
decisions relating to family, reproduction, and intimate relations. 63 While tradi
tionalism itself may not be the best mechanism to predict the outcome of a substan-
tive due process challenge related to reproductive rights, it can provide guidance
as to whether the claimed right looks similar to or could fall under other rights that
have been traditionally recognized.164
When framed as part of the existing right to make an abortion decision
without undue government interference, the right to have an abortion for any
reason appears significantly more justifiable. The decision to have an abortion
based on a genetic condition is no less intimate, challenging, or important than the
decision to have it for any other reason. If a woman has the right to decide to abort
her fetus because she cannot afford to keep it, she should also have the right to
decide to abort a fetus with a genetic condition because she cannot afford the care
157. See id.
158. Sunstein, supra note 151, at 990.
159. See id.
160. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
161. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (discussing the right to use contraceptives in
relation to the inherent privacy involved in marital relationships, but avoiding any discussion of
intimate relationships separate from marriage).
162. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
163. See Sunstein, supra note 151, at 990-91.
164. See id.; see also Tribe & Dorf, supra note 153, at 1101-02 (arguing that precedent and historical
tradition should be placed on equal footing in determining whether a fundamental right exists).
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the child would require. Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court in Thornburgh
v. American College ofObstetricians & Gynecologists' states that
[flew decisions are more personal and intimate, more properly private,
or more basic to individual dignity and autonomy, than a woman's
decision-with the guidance of her physician and within the limits
specified in Roe-whether to end her pregnancy. A woman's right to
make that choice freely is fundamental. 6 6
The Court has historically made no attempt to qualify how a woman weighs her
reasons or measure whether her reasons satisfy an external standard. A woman's
thought process surrounding the decision of whether and when to have a child,
with whom, and for what reasons should not be dissected by the government into
valid and invalid reasons once they have entered her mind.'6 ' There is nothing in-
herently special about choosing an abortion for genetic reasons that warrants
excluding them as a group from substantive due process protection. As a result, the
right to choose abortion based on the results from prenatal genetic tests should be
considered part of the existing fundamental right to choose to have an abortion.
The Court must then determine whether to extend substantive due process
protection to a decision to abort based on any genetic test or only certain ones.
Examining the justifications for creating the fundamental right to abortion offers
some guidance on how the Court might think about such issues. The Supreme
Court in Roe stressed the importance of protecting the abortion right because of
the burden a state prohibition on abortion would impose on a woman in the case
of an unwanted pregnancy.'6 ' The Court listed a series of potential harms that a
woman would have to face in pregnancy and child rearing, including specific and
direct harm caused by pregnancy and childbirth,'69 present or future distress caused
165. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
166. Id. at 772.
167. A citizen's right to privacy in his or her own thoughts has consistently been referred to as one of our
most fundamental rights. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969) ("Whatever the
power of the state to control public dissemination of ideas inimical to the public morality, it cannot
constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a person's private thoughts.");
Olmsteadv. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("The makers of our
Constitution ... sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their
sensations. They conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone-the most com-
prehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.").
168. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). In Part III noted that the impositions-based justifi-
cations for creation of the abortion right seemed to fit more directly with an equality-based approach;
however, since they were given to help justify the creation of a substantive due process right to pri-
vacy, they are worth exploring in this context as well.
169. Health risks during pregnancy include gestational diabetes, pregnancy-related high blood pressure,
anemia, depression, hyperemesis gravidarum (severe persistent nausea and vomiting), preeclampsia,
33
HeinOnline  -- 60 UCLA L. Rev. 33 2012
60 UCLA L. REV. 2 (2012)
by having a child or an additional child, psychological harm, mental and physical
health strains caused by child care, and the stigma of unwed motherhood. 70 Casey
further defined the strength of the woman's interest in abortion in terms of the
imposition placed on her by an unwanted pregnancy."' The Supreme Court held
that the state could not proscribe abortion in all instances because
the liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the human
condition and so unique to the law. The mother who carries a child to
fill term is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that only
she must bear. That these sacrifices have from the beginning of the hu-
man race been endured by woman with a pride that ennobles her in the
eyes of others and gives to the infant a bond of love cannot alone be
grounds for the State to insist she make the sacrifice. Her suffering is
too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without more, upon its
own vision of the woman's role ... 172
The Court held that the burdens and impositions associated with enduring preg-
nancy, giving birth, and raising a child were sufficient to establish a substantive
due process right that protects a woman's abortion decision from unwarranted
governmental interference.73 The impositions that warrant the creation of a sub-
stantive due process right seem to arise from being forced to carry and give birth
to a child that you have decided you do not want, regardless of the reason, rather
than the nature of the imposition posed on the mother from a specific genetic con-
dition or characteristic of the child. As a result, all reasons-genetic or otherwise-
for deciding to terminate a pregnancy should warrant substantive due process
protection.
2. The Undue Burden Analysis
The Court will analyze any substantive due process challenge brought to a
RBAP under the undue burden standard set out by the Court in Casey. The stand-
and a number of pregnancy-associated infections. Pregnancy Complications, WOMENSHEALTH.GOV
(Sept. 27, 2010), http://womenshealth.gov/pregnancy/you-are-pregnant/pregnancy-complica
tions.cfin.
170. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. The Court also noted, "There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated
with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable,
psychologically and otherwise, to care for it." Id.
171. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).
172. Id.
173. See I. Glenn Cohen, The Constitution and the Rights Not to Procreate, 60 STAN. L. REv. 1135, 1155
(2008) (suggesting that the burden that having a child places on a woman was crucial to the Court's
decision to protect her right to have an abortion).
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ard requires that until viability, a woman has the right to choose to have an abor-
tion without the state placing an undue burden on her.174 A law poses an undue
burden and is invalid when its "purpose or effect" is to place "a substantial obstacle
in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus."1 7 s The undue
burden test aims to assess a woman's ability to choose whether she should have a
child. But unlike other tests, the Court's definition of the undue burden test fo-
cuses more on the law's effect on the woman's ability to exercise her right rather
than on the nature of the state interest in regulating the right.'7 ' RBAPs' effect on
the exercise of the abortion right will depend on the lens through which the right
is viewed. This Subpart first examines the application of the undue burden test to
RBAPs through the test's existing liberty-based interpretation and then explores
the implication ofincorporating sex equality concerns to define the woman's inter-
ests further.
Under the existing framework, a court must first examine whether the partic-
ular RBAP creates an undue burden on a woman's right to choose to have an
abortion. The Supreme Court in Casey explained that an undue burden exists if
"in a large fraction of cases in which [the statute] is relevant, it will operate as a
substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an abortion."'7 7 According to
the Casey Court, "[T]he proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for
whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant."1 7 ' A
statute is "relevant" to all individuals on whom it has "some actual effect."179 As a
result, while considering the impact of a spousal notification law, the Supreme
Court in Casey defined the relevant group as the 1 percent of married women
seeking abortions who would not tell their spouses, not the other 99 percent for
whom the law would prove irrelevant.'s In Carhart, the Court defined the relevant
group as "all instances in which the doctor proposes to use the prohibited proce-
174. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
175. Id. at 877.
176. See, e.g., Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich, 627 N.E.2d 570, 576 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
177. Casey, 505 U.S at 895; see also Cincinnati Women's Serys., Inc. v. Taft, 468 F.3d 361, 369 (6th Cir
2006); Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. Lawall, 180 F.3d 1022, 1025 (9th Cir. 1999); Women's
Med. Profl Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 194 (6th Cir. 1997).
178. Casey, 505 U.S. at 894.
179. Planned Parenthood of Idaho, Inc. v. Wasden, 376 F.3d 908, 921 (9th Cir. 2004).
180. Casey, 505 U.S. at 894-95; see also Tucson Women's Ctr. v. Ariz. Med. Bd., 666 F. Supp. 2d 1091,
1097 (D. Ariz. 2009) (defining the relevant group for a statute requiring a twenty-four-hour wait-
ing period prior to an abortion as "all women who would not otherwise wait 24 hours to have an
abortion").
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dure, not merely those in which the woman suffers from medical complica-
tions.""'
With RBAPs, the relevant group should be all women who would have an
abortion solely because of the prohibited reason (for instance, women who would
abort solely based on the sex or race of the child in a state where sex- or race-
based abortions are prohibited). Unlike the regulation in Carhart, which did not
foreclose abortion altogether despite the fact that it may have precluded the safest
available procedure for a subset ofwomen,182 RBAPs prohibit the knowing provi-
sion of any kind of abortion for women who have decided to abort based on a pro-
hibited condition. These women must either withhold information from their
providers (and in the case of Oklahoma, refuse to answer a government form), or
opt not to have abortions, significantly infringing upon their autonomy to make
abortion decisions and to have open discussions with their physicians.
Because RBAPs proscribe providers from knowingly performing abortions
sought for designated reasons, this alone could constitute an undue burden for all
women seeking abortions for those reasons. Supporters of the law may argue that
the law is irrelevant to a significant fraction of the women who would seek abor-
tions for the proscribed reason because many of them might not tell their provid-
ers the reason they sought the abortions, thereby obviating the impact of the
regulation.' However, the prohibition on knowingly providing abortions for
the prohibited reason does not entirely define the law's effect. By singling out
certain reasons for having an abortion as inappropriate, RBAPs may also have neg-
ative effects on women wanting abortions for proscribed reasons, even if they had
not planned to tell their providers the reason they sought the abortions. Patients
who seek prohibited abortions may be nervous, less forthcoming with important
medical information, and concerned for their providers, thereby driving a wedge
in the physician-patient relationship.
In nearly all contexts, the law has sought to protect the sanctity of the
physician-patient relationship so that patients are able to be honest with their phy-
181. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007).
182. Id. at 188-89 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for holding that the ban on intact
D&X survives review because it would not be unconstitutional in a large fraction of relevant cases,
based on the assertion that "the very purpose of a health exception is to protect women in excep-
tional cases," and therefore the sheer volume of women for whom D&X would be the safest choice
is irrelevant).
183. Of course, in Oklahoma this argument will not stand because the state mandates providers to give all
patients seeking an abortion a form asking them to designate their reasons for seeking the abortion.
The form permits women to decline to state a reason (at the very end), but the state cannot rea-
sonably argue that it expects a significant fraction to decline to give a reason on a form it requires for
all abortions. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738k (West Supp. 2012).
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sicians to ensure the quality of their medical treatment, even regarding illegal
activities like drug use and prostitution.'8 4 In the case of RBAPs, physicians may
be more on edge or distant from patients whom they suspect might be pursuing
abortions for prohibited reasons, as some states may criminally sanction providers
for performing reasons-based abortions.' Some providers may refise to offer
abortion services to patients they suspect of seeking abortions for prohibited rea-
sons for fear of being sued by the state or a family member with standing. RBAPs
either prevent a woman from having an abortion for a proscribed reason or put her
at odds with her provider in ways that threaten the sanctity ofthe physician-patient
relationship in an unprecedented manner.
A state may also argue that while its RBAP prohibits abortion in certain
circumstances, the burden that it places on the abortion right is not "undue." The
state could emphasize that not all genetic information is equally important or
meaningful. Some information will reveal that the fetus will develop a severe
disorder that will cause death in early childhood. Other information will reveal
probable physical traits or characteristics. The state could argue that the severity
and range of the potential physical manifestations associated with the specific ge-
netic sequence should be relevant to defining the contours of any substantive due
process protections. For instance, a prohibition on a woman's right to abort her
fetus because she has discovered that it will develop Tay-Sachs disease, a neu-
rological disorder that causes progressive destruction of the nerve cells in the
184. However, all states have mandatory reporting laws for child abuse and neglect. See CHILD WELFARE
INFO. GATEWAY, MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE &NEGLECT: SUMMARY OF
STATE LAWS 1, 2-4 (2010), available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws-policies/
statutes/manda.pdf. Mandatory reporting laws for child abuse and neglect provide a telling
exception to the state's commitment to the patient-physician relationship. The state interferes in
the physician-patient relationship by requiring physicians to report suspected child abuse to the
police, who will then investigate the claim and hopeflly end any existing abuse. See id. at 6-55
(describing state statutes on mandatory reporting). In the case of reasons-based abortion prohi-
bitions, a provider who knows that a woman seeks an abortion for a prohibited reason can refuse to
provide the abortion, leaving the woman to find another provider who does not know her reason for
seeking the abortion or to try to obtain the abortion in a different state where it is not illegal. In
many cases, the RBAP will not prevent her from obtaining the abortion for the prohibited reason.
However, in states like Oklahoma that have very few abortion providers, some women who have
been turned down for an abortion in accordance with Oklahoma law may not have the means to
travel to a different provider or state. In these instances, the law may prevent the abortion. See
Kaiser Family Found., supra note 76. If a woman knew that she only had one opportunity to seek an
abortion, however, she would most likely be extremely cautious about revealing her reason for
seeking an abortion.
185. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.02(A)(1), (3) (West Supp. 2011) (making it a class three
felony to "perform[] an abortion knowing that [it] is sought based on the sex or race of the child" or
to "[s]olicit[] or accept[] monies to finance a sex-selection or race-selection abortion").
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brain and spinal cord and generally results in death by age five, may well constitute
an undue burden on a woman's liberty to decide to terminate her pregnancy.1 6
But would a prohibition on abortion based on physical characteristics constitute a
similarly undue burden? Disappointing parents who have preferences regarding
physical traits like eye color, sex, and height does not seem analogous.
Such an argument's success will depend on whether the Court focuses its
analysis on the obstacle directly placed in the path of a woman who has decided to
have an abortion or its assessment of the relative strengths and weaknesses of
women's liberty interests in aborting for various reasons. To date, the Court has
never permitted a law to directly prohibit a woman from having a previability
abortion once she has decided to do so. Under a liberty-based interpretation, the
Court should stay on this path. Permitting the state to regulate access to abortion
sought for certain reasons, but not others, invites states to pass numerous RBAPs
to redefine the boundaries of the abortion right, thereby creating a significant
amount of arguably arbitrary line-drawing work for the Court. More damning,
this approach would allow direct governmental intervention into a woman's repro-
ductive decisionmaking process. After a woman has received NIPD testing, state
restrictions on how she reaches her decision to terminate the fetus would reach
into some of the most intimate and personal decisions a person can make in an
area the U.S. Constitution is bound to protect from undue governmental interfer-
ence.'" Oklahoma's laws not only invade a woman's privacy by requiring that she
be asked to list her reasons for seeking an abortion,"' but they also restrict her
liberty to receive an abortion if her reason is not a state-approved one.'"' Such re-
strictions stand in direct contrast to the liberties protected in Roe and Casey, which
aimed to enable women to make the "ultimate decision" regarding abortion.'90
Once a woman has NIPD information about her fetus, it will be impossible for
her to ignore certain features of it in making a termination decision. Further, once
she has decided that a pregnancy is unwanted, she should not have to undergo the
risks, discomforts, and hardships of pregnancy, childbirth, and child rearing
simply because her reason for not wanting the pregnancy proved insufficient to
186. See Tay Sachs Disease, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, http://ghr.nlm.riih.gov/condition/tay-
sachs-disease (last reviewed Sept. 2008); see also ROBERTSON, supra note 92, at 150; Adrienne Asch,
Disability Equality and Prenatal Testing: Contradictory or Compatible, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 315,
339(2003).
187. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874-75 (1992).
188. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738k(F)(15).
189. Id. § 1-731.2.
190. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (holding that "what is at stake is the woman's right to make the ultimate
decision" free from undue governmental intrusion).
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the state. In considering RBAPs, the Court should reaffirm the importance of
strongly protecting procreative liberty with respect to previability abortions. A law
whose constitutionality depends on women withholding information from their
healthcare providers or sacrificing a constitutional right should not stand. Because
of the negative effects on all members of the relevant class, RBAPs, regardless of
the type of abortion they prohibit, should be held unconstitutional under Casey's
undue burden standard.
3. RBAPs and Sex Equality
Having analyzed RBAPs under a liberty-based interpretation of the undue
burden standard, I now consider the implications of incorporating sex equality ar-
guments into a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to RBAPs. The equality-based
interpretation of reproductive rights focuses on ensuring that our abortion laws
maintain equality between the sexes. According to Balkin, under the equality-
based interpretation, when "new reproductive technologies do not further equal-
ity between the sexes, their connections to the underlying justification for the
abortion right become greatly attenuated, and we should leave their regulation to
the political process in most cases."191 To define this approach further, one could
examine, as Robertson has proposed, whether being able to select against a specific
trait "is such an important part of personal liberty that it is essential for equal citi-
zenship."192 In other words, is a woman's ability to abort a fetus with a specific
genetic condition so important that not being able to do so compromises her
opportunities as an equal citizen? Some scholars have argued that having a child
with severe mental and physical disabilities could conceivably impair a woman's
ability to pursue social and economic opportunities in a similar manner as having
an unwanted child could compromise her opportunities.193 Certainly, the inability
to choose eye or hair color would not impair a woman's opportunities to function
as an equal citizen. Under an equality-based interpretation, the more severe and
burdensome the genetic condition, the stronger the woman's claim that the state
could not prohibit selective abortion for that condition, whereas for milder condi-
tions that did not pose a significant burden on the woman, an equality-based
191. Balkin, supra note 21, at 857.
192. Robertson, Abortion and Technology, supra note 97, at 346. In contrast, state bans on sex-selective
abortions are often justified as promoting equality between the sexes by taking a stand against sex
discrimination in abortion.
193. See, e.g., ROBERTSON, supra note 92, at 150.
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approach would permit the regulation to stand.'94 As a result, legislation regulat-
ing a woman's ability to receive an abortion for a low-imposition reason could
easily withstand a constitutional challenge, but legislation regulating a high-
imposition reason would have much more difficulty surviving.
While potentially appealing at first, there are significant reasons to oppose
directly incorporating sex equality considerations into constitutional analysis of
RBAPs. First, doing so prioritizes one form of equality significantly over another
by protecting women's equality at the expense of the equality of individuals with
genetic diseases, conditions, and characteristics that are deemed "undesirable."195
Such an approach would cast a dark shadow of eugenics over the states. This is
especially true given the fact that many of the impositions associated with having a
child with a genetic disorder or condition are socially constructed. 1 96 For a state
to attempt to draw lines between those genetic conditions for which a woman has
a fundamental right to abort and those for which she does not based on the relative
(and assumed) imposition of having a child with the specific condition, it would
have to publicly state that some lives are more burdensome than others.197 Such a
value judgment would be doubly reinforcing. If society did not provide the proper
support for individuals living in society with a certain genetic condition, the
potential imposition of having a child with that condition would increase. In some
cases, society, by failing to accommodate the needs of the disabled, may increase the
imposition of certain genetic disorders and then use the imposition of having a
child with those conditions to justify the decision to permit abortions of fetuses
194. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 876 (holding that the "undue burden standard is the appropriate means of
reconciling the State's interest with the woman's constitutionally protected liberty"); United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (reiterating that so long as a state's regulation is
rationally related to a legitimate government interest, it is constitutional, unless the right infringes
upon a citizen's fundamental right).
195. Sonia Suter acknowledged that an equality-based approach could be framed in multiple ways: sex
equality, equality among different races and socioeconomic groups, and equality between those
with disabilities and those without. Suter, supra note 85, at 1556-57. However, the majority of
references to an equality-based approach to reproductive rights discusses the approach in terms of sex
equality, rather than including equality among different races and socioeconomic groups or equality
between those with disabilities and those without. Balkin, supra note 21, at 859-61 (discussing the
benefits of grounding the abortion right in sex equality, while permitting notions of class equality from
the Equal Protection Clause to provide protection against state-sponsored eugenics).
196. Adrienne Asch, Reproductive Technology andDisability, in REPRODUCTIVE LAWS FOR THE 1990's,
at 69 (Sherrill Cohen & Nadine Taub eds., 1989); Sw. Educ. Dev. Lab., The Socially Constructed
Nature ofRace, Culture, and Disability, 4 RES. EXCHANGE, no. 3, 1999, http://www.ncddr.org/
products/researchexchange/v04nOl/concepts.htm1.
197. See Asch, supra note 186, at 338-39.
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that screen positive for those disorders.198 Adrienne Asch, a leading disability
rights scholar, has argued that as soon as the government makes a determination
that selective abortion is acceptable for certain genetic traits but not others, it
necessarily makes a value judgment that some lives are valued over others, which
"will surely exacerbate the discrimination and stigmatization of future children
with the listed conditions.""' Wrapping these distinctions in the language of
fundamental rights and equality will only serve to strengthen the idea that the
government sanctions women's decisions to abort fetuses with certain genetic
diseases or conditions, but not others. A sex equality-based approach would only
further entrench these discriminatory practices against those with undesirable gen-
etic characteristics, rather than counteract them.
Second, evaluating RBAPs based on equal protection arguments may inad-
vertently permit pro-life states to narrow the scope of available abortions signifi-
cantly by passing RBAPs for a wide range of conditions. As NIPD dramatically
expands the range of conditions available for prenatal testing and our understand-
ing of which genes influence which conditions improves, states may pass more
and more laws prohibiting abortions for specific reasons that do not restrict gen-
der equality, thereby creating an ever-diminishing realm of permitted abortions
that would constrain women's procreative choices in ways unseen since the passage
ofRoe.200
As a result, while incorporating sex equality concerns into the justifications
for maintaining the abortion right is logically intuitive for many reasons, in the
context of NIPD it potentially opens the door to government regulation of selec-
tive abortion for a wide range of genetic conditions and characteristics. Expanding
its use into the realm of reproductive genetic testing and selective abortion could
have highly detrimental consequences for individuals living with undesired gen-
etic characteristics and the families of individuals with those characteristics. For
the above reasons, courts should avoid using sex equality considerations to de-
termine which genetic conditions can justify a woman's abortion decision.
A strong liberty-based analysis of RBAPs, however, would simultaneously
protect women's ability to abort for any reason while also protecting their equality
with men and serving other goals as well. In the context of RBAPs, a liberty-based
198. For further discussion of the potential for discrimination caused by regulating prenatal genetic tests,
see id. at 339. To avoid discrimination and negative public perception, disease-based interest groups
are likely to lobby strongly both their state and federal representatives to avoid being included in the
list of abortable conditions.
199. Id. at 339.
200. See AMERICANS UNITED FOR LIFE, supra note 4, at 5-6 (proposing prohibiting abortions sought
solely because the fetus has a genetic abnormality or a potential genetic abnormality).
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approach preserves women's equality by ensuring that they have the ability to
make reproductive choices in light of their personal and career goals, as all reasons
for having an abortion are protected. A strong liberty-based interpretation could
also provide a good compromise between a woman's reproductive autonomy and
disability equality. While disability rights advocates stake out a wide array of
positions on selective abortion, many would generally prefer to ban all disability-
based selective abortions.20 ' However, doing so would severely curtail a woman's
reproductive autonomy. Alternatively, a number of disability rights scholars have
spoken out in favor of full reproductive autonomy and against any reasons-based
restrictions on selective abortion to prevent the government from delineating the
lives it values from those it does not.20 2 Further, prioritizing liberty and autonomy
above all in the RBAP analysis would realign the sanctity of the physician-patient
relationship and prevent the government from intruding into the private thoughts
ofits citizens as they make some ofthe most personal decisions of their lives. Reaf-
firming women's fundamental liberty interest in being able to decide to have an
abortion for any reason without undue governmental interference is essential to
maintaining both equality and liberty with respect to selective abortion.
4. Practical Challenges
In addition to the constitutional challenges RBAPs are likely to face, states
will also encounter numerous practical challenges to their enforcement. While
RBAPs may prevent women from revealing their reasons to abortion providers, in
practice women can still obtain abortions for prohibited reasons. Existing RBAPs
do not create penalties for women who sought and received abortions based on the
sex or race of their fetuses nor do they require affidavits from women stating their
reasons for seeking abortions.
In reality, these laws serve little function other than to demonstrate state
disapproval of abortions for purportedly inappropriate reasons, to place barriers
between women and their abortion providers, and to test the boundaries of
Fourteenth Amendment due process protection. But they may prove quite effec-
tive for these purposes. Sex- and race-based abortion prohibitions may not pre-
vent women who are sure they want sex- or race-based abortions from receiving
201. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disability, Life, Death, and Choice, 29 HARv. J.L. & GENDER 425, 439
(2006); John F. Muller, The New Parenthood and the OldAmbivalenceAbout Disability: Baby Doe,
Prenatal Testing, and'Disability Rights (Yale Law Sch. Student Prize Paper No. 44,2009), http://digital
commons.law.yale.edu/ylsspps-papers/44.
202. See, e.g., Asch, supra note 186, at 339.
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them; instead, they may serve to dissuade undecided women by sending them
a clear message that sex and race are not appropriate factors to consider in making a
decision about whether to have an abortion. Consequently, this legislation may
reduce the overall number of sex-or race-based abortions.
In sum, the Court should reaffirm that the Fourteenth Amendment protects
a woman's right to have an abortion for any reason prior to viability. The Court
should evaluate challenges to RBAPs under the existing undue burden standard
and strongly reinforce a woman's procreative liberty interest in her abortion deci-
sions. The right to abortion should not be divided into appropriate and inap-
propriate reasons; rather, it should be protected prior to viability for all reasons. In
the context of RBAPs, a strong liberty-based interpretation will protect women's
interests in sex equality, but it will not permit those same interests to limit the
scope of the abortion right. Because of the direct negative impact RBAPs put on
all women seeking abortions for the proscribed reasons, the Court should strike
them down as unconstitutional.
IV. REASONS-BASED TESTING PROHIBITIONS
As a result of the constitutional and practical challenges associated with
RBAPs, states may seek other methods of regulating reasons-based abortions.
Rather than prohibiting the provision of abortions performed for specific reasons,
states may decide to restrict women's access to NIPD to prevent prospective par-
ents from receiving the information on which to make a selective abortion
decision.203 For instance, a state wishing to prevent sex-selective abortions could
attempt to prohibit NIPD testing for a fetus's sex prior to viability.204 Given the
wide range of genetic information that could be offered to parents through NIPD,
the early stage in the pregnancy in which the information is provided to prospec-
tive parents, and the relative ease of procuring an abortion earlier in pregnancy,
many states may attempt to restrict the genetic tests that can be offered in an
203. See Robertson, Abortion and Technology, supra note 97, at 377; Suter, supra note 85, at 1517, 1531
(suggesting that some states might restrict the ability to get information about fetal traits by prenatal
or preimplantation genetic testing).
204. Postviability, parents would still have plenty of time to decorate the nursery, have a pink- or blue-
themed baby shower, and pick a name, but they could not use the information to decide whether to
abort. For a constitutional analysis of a woman's right to engage in sex selection, see John R.
Schaibley III, Note, Sex Selection Abortion: A Constitutional Analysis of the Abortion Liberty and a
Person' Right to Know, 56 IND. L.J. 281 (1981), and Angela M. Long, Why Criminalizing Sex
Selection Techniques Is Unjust:An Argument Challenging Conventional Wisdom, 14 HEALTH L.J. 69,
79 (2006) (noting that the Canadian Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies rec-
ommended that fetal sex information not be disclosed to patients until the third trimester).
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NIPD protocol in hopes that those restrictions will be more effective at preventing
selective abortion than restrictions on the abortions themselves. The following
section will explore the Fourteenth Amendment challenges to reasons-based test-
ing prohibitions (RBTPs).
If the proposed framework in Part III is adopted, such that all reasons for
seeking an abortion are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, the question
then arises whether the ability to access the test that would inform a protected
decision would always be protected as part of the right to make the decision itself
While scholars and courts have debated the question, the law is not settled on this
issue.205 Proponents of RBTPs may also raise First Amendment challenges that
Suter and Robertson have considered, but it is my intent here to limit the focus to
the Fourteenth Amendment.206 This Part analyzes arguments on both sides of this
issue and concludes that the Fourteenth Amendment should protect the ability to
decide to have a prenatal genetic test.
A. A Right to Prenatal Genetic Testing
The Northern District of Illinois's 1990 decision in Lichez v. Hartigan. is
the only federal decision to address directly whether the constitutional protections
created in Roe v. Wade extend to prenatal genetic testing. In that case, physicians
challenged the Illinois Abortion Law that prohibited experimentation on a human
fetus unless the experimentation was therapeutic to the fetus, on the grounds that
the law was unconstitutionally vague and violated the woman's right to privacy in
reproductive decisions.208 The physicians claimed that the vagueness of the term
"experiment" could include prenatal genetic testing procedures, like amniocentesis
and CVS, which women often used in determining whether to terminate their
205. See Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Radhika Rao, EqualLiberty:Assisted
Reproductive Technology and Reproductive Equality, 76 GEO WASH. L. REV. 1457, 1487 (2008)
(arguing that it would be constitutional to prohibit prenatal testing to obtain information about cer-
tain genetic and chromosomal conditions, but that the right to abort a fetus should be protected in all
instances, regardless of a woman's reasons); Robertson, supra note 91, at 427; Suter, supra note 85,
at 1531-36.
206. See Robertson, Abortion and Technology, supra note 97, at 377; Suter, supra note 85, at 1534-37. In
the immediate context of NIPD and RBTPs, the state should have the ability to restrict the sale of a
particular genetic test without running afoul of the First Amendment. The question of whether
the state can restrict the communication of genetic testing results without violating the First
Amendment, however, will be extremely important with respect to whole genome sequencing. I
plan to address this issue in future work.
207. 735 F. Supp. 1361.
208. Id. at 1363 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 81-26, § 6(7) (1989)).
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pregnancies and were not "therapeutic.' 209 The District Court concluded that the
Fourteenth Amendment protected a woman's ability to access prenatal testing,
stating that
[t]he cluster of constitutional choices that includes the right to abort a
fetus within the first trimester must also include the right to submit to
a procedure designed to give information about that fetus which can
then lead to a decision to abort. Since there is no compelling state in-
terest sufficient to prevent a woman from terminating her pregnancy
during the first trimester, there can be no such interest sufficient to in-
trude upon these other protected activities during the first trimester.210
Since the decision, scholars have frequently cited Lifchez as demonstrating the
existence of a right to access prenatal testing.211
On the other hand, Lifchez was decided before Casey and Carhart, and before
NIPD opened up a new world of possibilities in prenatal genetic testing. The
changes in doctrine brought about by Casey and Carhart raise significant questions
about whether Lifchez would still be decided the same way today. While the
Casey Court emphasized that autonomy and the ability to make autonomous
decisions are crucial to self-definition, it also stressed the importance of the
state's interest in potential life even during the first trimester.2 12 In Carhart, the
Court shifted away from its reasoning in prior procreative liberty cases by placing
far less importance on individual autonomy in favor of a more paternalistic
and society-oriented stance. 213  But the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of
209. Id at 1366.
210. Id at 1377 (citations omitted); see also Forbes v. Napolitano, 236 F.3d 1009, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000)
(Sneed, J., concurring).
211. See, e.g., Maureen McBrien, Human Cloning: Beyond the Realm of the Constitutional Right to
ProcreativeLiberty, 21 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 107,120-21 (2002-2003); Amber Stine, The Implications
ofthe Due Process Clause on the Future ofHuman Embryonic Gene Therapy, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 507,
519 (2003); Note, Regulating Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis: The Pathologization Problem, 118
HARV. L. REv. 2770,2773-74 (2005).
212. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873 (1992) ("[N]ot every law which makes
a right more difficult to exercise is, ipsofacto, an infringement ofthat right.").
213. See, e.g., David L. Faigman, DfningEmpiricalFrames ofReference in Constitutional Cases: Unraveling
theAs-Applied Versus Facial Distinction in Constitutional Law, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q 631,
647 (2009) ("Unfortunately, the fact-standard applicable after Casey became substantially more
convoluted with the Court's decision in Gonzales v. Carhart .... Without overruling Carhart I
explicitly, the [Gonzalez v. Carhart] Court upheld a virtually identical federal version of the state law
invalidated in the earlier case."); Greenhouse, supra note 112, at 43 ("[I]t is as if [in Carhart] two
decades of post-Roe discourse have been erased, decades during which the Court by fits and starts
constructed a unified jurisprudence of women's rights and abortion rights. Beginning with the
Thornburgh decision in 1986, and reaching a peak in PlannedParenthoodv. Casey in 1992, the Court
gradually came to place women at the center of decision-making about their own reproductive lives,
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2003214 that the Court upheld in Carhart only prohibited a particular method of
abortion rather than prohibiting a woman's ability to obtain an abortion once she
had decided she did not want the fetus, which is the case with RBAPs. So while
these cases may demonstrate a general shift in how the Court weighs the
respective state and individual interests with respect to abortion, they do not
negate the overall importance of procreative liberty and personal autonomy in the
Court's Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.
Over the last thirty years, prenatal genetic testing has become entrenched
into prenatal practice. 215 In fact, California and Iowa currently require physicians
to offer prenatal screening to all pregnant women, followed by invasive prenatal
genetic testing if necessary and desired.216 Many women have come to expect and
depend upon the ability to use prenatal genetic testing to screen for and diagnose
certain genetic diseases to facilitate their private decisions about abortion.217 Giv-
en the importance of all forms of prenatal genetic testing in standard prenatal
practice and the relevance of the information provided by such tests to constitu-
tionally protected decisions regarding reproduction, medical care, and parenting,
Fourteenth Amendment protection should extend to a woman's ability to decide
to have NIPD. To balance the various state and individual interests associated
with widespread NIPD appropriately, however, the Court should carefully select
the applicable standard of review.
B. The Standard of Review
Determining the appropriate standard of review for regulation that con-
strains a constitutionally protected right is not as simple as it once was. During
the twentieth century, the Court developed tiers of scrutiny to evaluate the validity
of government action that restrained individual rights. 218 Laws that restricted fun-
damental due process rights, classified groups by race or national origin, restricted
content-based speech, or impinged upon religious belief or free exercise were all
and to understand freedom ofreproductive decision-making as central to women's equality." (footnotes
omitted)); Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics ofProtection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/
Carhart, 117 YALE LJ. 1694, 1767 & n.197 (2008).
214. 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006).
215. See Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 220-21 & n.124 (E.D. La. 1980) (finding amnio-
centesis to be "an important medical procedure" that is not experimental).
216. Jelliffe-Pawlowski et al., supra note 56.
217. See Sonia M. Suter, A Brave New World ofDesigner Babies?, 22 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 897, 928
(2007).
218. See Calvin Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 945,
945 (2004).
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presumptively void and subject to strict scrutiny.219 Laws that did not implicate
these rights were subjected to the default level of minimal scrutiny and were pre-
sumed valid so long as they were rationally related to a legitimate state interest.220
Over time, however, the Court has recognized that some "presumptively unlawful
actions were more easily justifiable than others" and held that some presumptively
valid actions should not survive minimal scrutiny.221 This reasoning led to the
development of a tiered review system with the introduction of intermediate
scrutiny for government regulations that classify individuals based on sex or legit-
imacy, content-neutral speech regulations, and commercial speech regulations.222
Intermediate scrutiny generally requires the government to prove that its regula-
tion is substantially related to an important state objective.223 Next, the Court
applied an enhanced version of minimal scrutiny, the aptly named "rational basis
with bite" standard, which allows government regulations to be struck down if
they do not further legitimate government interests.224 In the realm of substantive
due process protections, the Court's recent jurisprudence is a bit muddled with
respect to the appropriate standard of review.
Given the range of interests at stake with respect to RBTPs and the Court's
opaque justifications for applying a particular standard of review in many of its
recent cases, the standard of review that the Court should apply to RBTP chal-
lenges is not immediately clear. What does seem evident is that RBTPs are likely
to be subject to a standard of review less stringent than strict scrutiny and more
stringent than the minimal scrutiny of the rational basis test. Without question,
RBTPs implicate a woman's procreative liberty and privacy in her personal
relations. In Lawrence v. Texas,225 the Court did not explicitly establish that a fun
damental right to privacy existed in all intimate relationships, but it did invoke a
standard beyond mere minimal scrutiny.226 Casey's undue burden standard pro-
vides heightened scrutiny to abortion regulations, but there is open debate among
scholars about whether this constitutes a form of intermediate scrutiny within the
219. See id. at 949-50.
220. See id. at 951-52.
221. Id. at 945; see, e.g., U.S. Dep't ofAgric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973) (holding that the
government did not have a legitimate governmental interest in preventing hippies and members of
a hippie commune from participating in the food stamps program).
222. See Massey, supra note 218, at 950-51.
223. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
224. Massey, supra note 218, at 945, 951-56; see, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473
U.S. 432 (1985); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
225. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
226. See Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The'FundamentalRight" ThatDareNot SpeakItsName,
117 HARv. L. REv. 1893,1916-17 (2004).
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existing tier system or something different altogether.227 Further, the undue bur-
den standard by definition only examines the law's impact on a woman's ability to
decide to have an abortion and does not adequately address her interest in using
NIPD testing for reasons other than informing a selective abortion decision.
RBTPs may constrain a woman's personal autonomy in medical decisions, a right
that the Supreme Court has reviewed by balancing the state and individual interests
in cases like Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department ofHealth28 and Youngberg v.
Romeo.229
In addition to her substantive due process interests, RBTPs also implicate a
woman's sex equality interests. Equal protection challenges based on a gender-
based government action are subject to intermediate scrutiny review, which re-
quires an exceedingly persuasive justification for the action.23 0 Laws that infringe
upon each of the different rights implicated by NIPD use have received some form
of elevated scrutiny above the rational basis standard.231 As such, the Court should
adopt a standard of review that balances the relevant state and individual interests
but prioritizes women's interests in procreative liberty and sex equality.
C. Intermediate Scrutiny With an Exceedingly PersuasiveJustification
Intermediate scrutiny with an exceedingly persuasive justification (I refer to
this as the exceedingly persuasive justification standard) provides a good framework
for creating a standard of review for RBTPs or any other law restricting reproduc-
tive genetic tests. As applied in United States v. Virginia,232 the state must show
that the challenged sex-based classification serves 'important governmental objec-
tives and that the discriminatory means employed' are 'substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives."'233 Further, the state has the "demanding" bur
den of demonstrating that its justification for such an action is "exceedingly persua-
sive." 234 This justification must also be "genuine, not hypothesized or invented
post hoc in response to litigation."" In its sex-based equal protection jurisprudence,
the Court frequently finds no exceedingly persuasive justification, but the standard
227. See Massey, supra note 218, at 966.
228. 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990).
229. 457 U.S. 307,321 (1982).
230. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
231. For a description of scrutiny of procreative, personal, and parenting rights that can be associated with
NIPD, see infra Part IV.C.1.b.ii.
232. 518 U.S. 515.
233. Id. at 533 (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,724 (1982)).
234. Id. (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724).
235. Id.
48
HeinOnline  -- 60 UCLA L. Rev. 48 2012
Not This Child
has permitted state-mandated gender classifications to survive in some instanc-
es.236 With a few adjustments, a similar standard could be applied to government
efforts to regulate access to NIPD in a way that could more accurately account for
the relative differences in genetic tests.
Use of an intermediate standard developed to protect the interests of
women is a logical choice for RBTPs. RBTPs threaten a range of constitutionally
protected rights, particularly for women. The exceedingly persuasive justification
standard provides substantial protection for the range of interests a pregnant
woman has in prenatal genetic testing while permitting states to restrict a woman's
ability to test in order to further states' important interests in rare, but identifiable,
instances. In the context of RBTPs, a government's justification should not be
found exceedingly persuasive without empirical evidence demonstrating its valid-
ity. This justification must be based on evidence, rather than conjecture or as-
sumptions, though it need not be compelling evidence.
1. The Relevant Interests
In establishing a new standard, it is important to define the relevant interests
on both sides. The Court has established state interests related to reproductive
decisions. These interests, described in detail below, include maintaining medical
standards, protecting the woman's health, protecting potential life, and preserving
the medical profession's integrity. Further, I argue for the inclusion of an addi-
tional state interest in protecting societal integrity, which will include the notion of
equality based on race, on socioeconomic status, and on level of ability. A woman's
interests include protecting her procreative, personal, and parental liberties, as well
as maintaining equality in society with men. The following Subpart outlines the
role of these interests with respect to state regulation of NIPD testing for specific
genetic conditions.
236. See, e.g., Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724, 733 (striking down Mississippi University for Women's single-sex
admissions policy); see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 139-42 (1994) (striking
down gender-based peremptory challenges injury selection). But see Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53,
71 (2001) (upholding regulations granting citizenship to a child born abroad to a noncitizen mother
and a citizen father, where the same regulations would not apply if the noncitizen parent was the
father); Heckier v. Matthews, 465 U.S. 728, 745-46 (1984) (holding that the protection of reasonable
reliance on Social Security benefits for spouses constituted an exceedingly persuasive justification).
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a. The State's Interests
Roe and Casey acknowledged three important state interests that would jus-
tify regulation in the area of abortion so long as they did not impose an undue
burden prior to viability. These interests include maintaining medical standards,
preserving the mother's health, and protecting potential human life.237 In Gonzales
v. Carhart, the Supreme Court further expanded the state interests that could
justify regulating abortion to include protecting society and the medical profession
from moral "coarsen[ing],"238 which Sonia Suter has termed "repugnance. "239
None of these interests are sufficient to prohibit a woman from having an abor-
tion, but the Casey Court held that a state can "enact laws to provide a reasonable
framework for a woman to make a decision that has such profound and lasting
meaning."240 As part of this framework, states can pass laws designed to advance
their interest in potential life "as long as their purpose is to persuade the woman to
choose childbirth over abortion," and so long as the method of persuasion does
not constitute an undue burden on the overall right to have an abortion.24 1 In
drawing lines between what constitutes an undue burden and what is a legitimate
method of persuasion in a reasonable framework for decisionmaking, the Court
has upheld statutes that require women to receive certain information regarding
their fetuses and the abortion procedure, to wait twenty-four hours prior to having
an abortion procedure, and to receive only certain kinds of abortion procedures.242
The Court has invalidated spousal notification laws and parental notification laws
for creating an undue burden on a woman's ability to seek an abortion.243
The state's general interests in regulating NIPD will not differ from its
interests in regulating abortions, but the widespread availability of NIPD will
alter the strength of some of the interests in ways that can affect the balance of
rights between the interests of the woman and those of the state. In this Subpart,
I analyze the impact of NIPD on each of the existing state interests and then ar-
237. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 149-50 (1973).
238. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007).
239. Suter, supra note 85, at 1519.
240. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873 (1992); see Suter, supra note 85, at 1592
(arguing that the repugnance interest could, over time, be expanded ad infinitum to subsume much
of our currently understood reproductive right).
241. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878 (emphasis added).
242. See Carhart, 550 U.S at 158; Casey, 505 U.S. at 886-87 (illustrating that a twenty-four-hour
waiting period does not constitute an undue burden on the mother).
243. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 888-98 (stating that mandatory spousal notification constitutes an undue
burden because it will keep many women from getting abortions).
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gue that the integration of NIPD into standard prenatal care warrants expanding
the state's interests to include a new interest in protecting societal integrity.
i. Maintaining Medical Standards
The state's interest in maintaining the standards of medical practice provides
a strong rationale for states to determine which genetic tests are appropriate for
use in the prenatal context. First and foremost, a state will want to ensure that all
prenatal genetic tests meet minimum standards for accuracy and reliability. As
early as 1978, federal courts acknowledged that "[s]ociety has an interest in sur-
ing that [prenatal] genetic testing is properly performed and interpreted."244
Typically, ensuring the accuracy and reliability of medical tests falls to
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the Center for Medicaid
and Medicare Services (CMS). CMS is the agency responsible for administer-
ing the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA). Neither agency,
however, has an affirmative position with respect to regulating genetic tests.24 5
The FDA has taken some affirmative steps over the last few years to demonstrate
its intention to regulate access to genetic tests, but the exact mechanism and form
ofits intended regulations remain unknown. 246 In a press briefing, the FDA stated
that the level of regulation necessary would vary depending on the risk the specific
test poses to the consumer, which would include the potential harm from an incor-
rect result.24 7 This statement may indicate that the FDA's intended approval pro-
cess will consider the context in which a genetic test is used, meaning that it may
be more restrictive regarding the accuracy of prenatal tests than for the same gen-
etic tests offered postnatally.241
In the absence of an FDA regulatory framework for genetic tests, states may
wish to restrict the use of NIPD for certain conditions on the basis that certain
tests are not sufficiently determinative of phenotype to justify use in a prenatal
context. Currently, the vast majority of available prenatal genetic tests have high
244. Gildiner v. ThomasJefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692,696 (E.D. Pa 1978).
245. DEP'T OF HEALTH &HUMAN SERVS., U.S. SYSTEM OF OVERSIGHT OF GENETIC TESTING:
A RESPONSE TO THE CHARGE OF THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 29
(2008), availableathttp://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/sacghs/reports/sacghs-oversightreport.pdf. For
a more detailed explanation of the various entities that may determine the availability ofNIPD tests,
see King, supra note 22, at 633-38.
246. See Alla Katsnelson, Consumer Gene Testing in the Hotseat: A Week ofHearings Sows Uncertaintyfor
the Fledgling Consumer Genomics Industry, NATURE (July 29,2010), http://www.nature.com/news/
2010/100729/full/news.2010.382.html.
247. Id.
248. See King, supra note 22, at 635.
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analytic and clinical validity-in other words, they are highly accurate at identify-
ing the genetic sequence, or genotype, in question, 249 and the genotype is highly
predictive of the physical manifestation of the disease or condition, or pheno-
type.250 However as our knowledge of genetics has grown, our ability to test for
genetic mutations has moved, and will continue to reach, far beyond those diseases
and conditions caused by a single genetic mutation. The vast majority of heritable
traits and conditions result from a variety of gene-gene and gene-environment
interactions, which can compromise the accuracy of a genetic test. Numerous
factors could cause an individual to receive a test result indicating that the fetus has
the genotype that corresponds with a particular genetic condition from a test with
high analytical validity but have a child who does not present the phenotype of the
condition that was tested for.25 1 A test with low clinical validity could cause a
woman to abort a fetus that would never develop the genetic condition in ques-
tion, causing needless heartache, loss, and expenditure of healthcare resources.252
Given the state's interest in preserving medical standards and its interest in preserv-
ing unborn fetal life, it may wish to establish certain threshold levels for the clinical
validity of NIPD to avoid having women make termination decisions based on
unreliable test results.
ii. The Pregnant Woman's Health
On the other hand, the state's interest in protecting the pregnant woman's
health would encourage NIPD use, rather than permit its restriction, as it pre-
sents little to no risk to the woman. While NIPD does raise questions regarding
249. See NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, ENHANCING THE OVERSIGHT OF GENETIC TESTS:
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SACGT 15 (2000), available at http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/sacgt/
reports/oversight report.pdf.
250. See id. at 15.
251. A particular mutation's presence may be only one part of a multifactorial predisposition to disease;
other genetic sequences or environmental factors and their interaction may also contribute to the
development of the disease phenotype. See Francis S. Collins et al., U.S. Nat'l Human Genome
Research Inst., A Vision for the Future of Genomics Research: A Blueprint for the Genomic Era, 422
NATURE 836, 840 (2003). For example, an allele may have low penetrance, meaning that the
presence of a particular genotype will not always produce the predicted phenotype. Denise Casey,
Evaluating Genetic Tests: Some Considerations, HUMAN GENOME PROJECT INFO. (Aug. 1998),
http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/HumanGenome/resource/testeval.shtml (last modified
Sept. 19, 2008). Low penetrance can even occur in single gene disorders. Additionally, epigenetic
factors, which are also controlled by other genes and the environment, can affect whether a gene is
turned "on" or "off', which can alter the phenotype. See Elizabeth Pennisi, Behind the Scenes ofGene
Expression, 293 SCIENCE 1064 (2001).
252. See Gregorio M. Garcia, The FDA andRegulation ofGenetic Tests: Building Confidence andPromoting
Safety, 48JURIMETRICS 217,232 (2008); King, supra note 22, at 636.
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informed consent and genetic counseling that can have a significant impact on the
pregnant woman's health,253 these concerns would not affect the state's ability to
regulate access to a particular test. As a result, this interest provides little support
to a state's attempt to regulate access to NIPD.
iii. Protecting Potential Life and the Status of the Embryo
As NIPD poses no direct threat to the embryo, some may argue that the
state interest in protecting the potential life should not factor into decisions to
regulate access to NIPD. A state may argue, however, that even its nascent inter-
est in protecting fetal life ought to permit it to take action to prevent any fetus
from being aborted solely on the basis ofits sex or physical characteristics, like skin,
hair, or eye color. If the state does indeed have an "important and legitimate" in-
terest254 in potential life "from the outset,"25s one could argue that the interest
should permit the state to restrict the provision of certain genetic information
sought solely for parental preference, especially those that are discriminatory in
nature.256 Permitting the strength of the woman's interest in testing for a specific
genetic condition to fluctuate based on the condition may shift the balance in
favor of the state's interest in some instances. The woman's liberty interest will
decrease as the genetic condition prohibited by the statute imposes a lesser fin-
ancial, emotional, and physical burden on her life. Following this logic, a state
could argue that it should be able to restrict access to NIPD for traits like hair color.
If the strength of women's interest in genetic knowledge varies with the condition
tested for, but the state's interest in protecting unborn life is the same for all con-
ditions,257 then for some conditions the state's interest in protecting life could
outweigh women's interests in the information.
Rather than making such a claim based on an interest in unborn prenatal life,
states may also argue that selective abortion based on certain genetic characteristics
violates rights owed to the previability fetus. The previability fetus's legal status
has not been conclusively determined. The law treats previability fetuses differ-
253. For a detailed discussion of these issues, see King, supra note 22, at 640-47.
254. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992).
255. Id. at 869.
256. See id. at 869-71. If the Constitution protects a woman from being fired from her government job
solely on the basis of her sex, could it not protect female fetuses from being aborted solely on the basis
of their sex?
257. The state's level of interest in preserving potential life should be equivalent across all fetuses
regardless of their genotype. This interest should increase throughout the course of the pregnancy,
whereas the mother's interest in accessing prenatal genetic information will vary with the genetic
condition.
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ently in different contexts. In the criminal context, harming a previability fetus
can result in the same set of charges as harm to a person.258 In the abortion context,
the previability fetus is not considered a person,2 59 but whether its status resembles
that of any other mass of cells or it has some heightened significance remains
unsettled.260 More recently, in the context of assisted reproduction and in vitro
fertilization, the Tennessee Supreme Court in Davis v. Davis"' held that preim-
plantation embryos were entitled to "special respect," which falls somewhere in
between person and property.262 Margaret Olivia Little has advanced a similar
view, stating that
a great many people believe [in] a graduatedview of embryonic and fetal
status: even at early stages of pregnancy, developing human life has an
important value worthy of respect; its status grows as it does, increasing
gradually until, at some point late in pregnancy, the fetus is deserving of
the very strong moral protection due newborns.263
A state could argue that part of treating embryos and fetuses with "special respect"
ought to entail not permitting the use of information regarding certain genetic
characteristics to influence a woman's decision about whether to carry the child
to term. These claims, while novel, would strain legislative or regulatory body
decisionmaking capabilities. However, drawing any lines between appropriate
and inappropriate prenatal genetic tests based on the immeasurable state interest
in protecting unborn fetal life permits a significant amount of arbitrary
decisionmaking, which would grant state legislatures and courts a good deal of
discretion in establishing those boundaries and limiting women's access to valua-
ble prenatal information.
iv. Protecting the Integrity and Ethics ofthe Medical Profession
A state might also try to justify an RBTP based on its interest in "pro-
tecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession. 264 In Washington v.
258. See Fetal Homicide Laws, NAT'L CONF. STATE LEGISLATUJRES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-
research/health/fetal-homicide-state-laws.aspx (last updated Apr. 2012).
259. Indeed, the Court in Roe v. Wade stated that "the word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth
Amendment, does not include the unborn." 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
260. See Lisa Shaw Roy, Roe and the New Frontier, 27 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 339, 357, 374-76
(2003).
261. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
262. Id.at596-97.
263. Little, supra note 70, at 332.
264. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
731 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
54
HeinOnline  -- 60 UCLA L. Rev. 54 2012
Not This Child
Glucksberg,265 Washington state invoked its interest in protecting the medical
profession's integrity to prohibit physician-assisted suicide.266 In Gonzales v.
Carhart,26 7 the Supreme Court applied this interest to the abortion context by
using it to uphold the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003,268 which prohibits
abortion methods that involve partial delivery of a living fetus.269 To avail of this
interest, states would have to argue that performing a prenatal genetic blood test
that may inform a selective abortion differs so significantly from performing any
other traditionally performed test during pregnancy that could inform an
abortion that it "implicates additional ethical and moral concerns that justify a
special prohibition. "270 While the state's interest in protecting the medical
profession's integrity and ethics as laid out in Carhart has been criticized as "vague
and unbounded," using the interest to ban access to NIPD appears to be outside of
even its furthest potential boundary.271
While prenatal tests that would inform selective abortions may raise ethical
objections from the medical community,272 they do not appear to trigger the same
kinds of ethical concerns as those raised by physician-assisted suicide in Glucksberg
and by partial-birth abortion in Carhart. In both cases, the Court permitted the
state to draw "boundaries to prevent certain practices that extinguish life and are
close to actions that are condemned." 273 In Glucksberg, the Court acknowledged
the state's fear that legalizing physician- assisted suicide would be a first step
toward permitting voluntary and perhaps involuntary euthanasia.274 In Carhart, the
Court acknowledged the congressional finding that abortion methods involving
partial delivery of a live fetus "had a'disturbing similarity to the killing of a newborn
infant,' and thus it was concerned with 'draw[ing] a bright line that clearly distin-
265. 521U.S.702.
266. Id. at 705-06.
267. 550U.S.124.
268. 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006).
269. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 168.
270. Id. at 158.
271. Suter, supra note 85, at 1568, 1585-86 (referring to this interest as the "repugnance approach" to
reproductive rights and ultimately rejecting it).
272. For example, consider the opinion ofMark Hughes, a pioneer of preimplantation genetic diagnosis
(a procedure that enables couples who have gone through in vitro fertilization to test their in vitro
embryos for genetic conditions prior to implantation) and director of Genesis Genetics Institute (a
prominent fertility lab in Detroit), that while creating designer babies is "technically feasible and it
can be done ... no legitimate lab would get into it, and if they did, they'd be ostracized." See Gautam
Naik, A Baby, Please. Blond, Freckles-Hold the Colic, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 2009, http://online.
wsj.com/article/SB123439771603075099.html.
273. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 158.
274. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,732-35 (1997).
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guishes abortion and infanticide."'27 5 The actions involved in performing NIPD,
however, are no different than performing any other blood test, which limits a
state's ability to claim that its interest in protecting the medical profession's integ-
rity should have much sway in the balance of a woman's ability to have NIPD.
V. Protecting Societal Integrity
The integration of NIPD into prenatal medical practice raises additional
concerns at the societal level that have not yet manifested in the abortion context.
This Subpart argues that these societal concerns warrant the recognition of a new
state interest in protecting societal integrity. Merriam-Webster's Dictionary de-
fines integrity as follows: "1: firm adherence to a code of especially moral or
artistic values, 2: an unimpaired condition, 3: the quality ofbeing complete or undi-
vided."276 Each definition encapsulates some portion of the state interest I intend
to describe, but the third-the quality or state of being complete or undivided-
is the most salient. Unregulated NIPD accompanied by selective abortion has the
capacity to cause significant changes in the makeup of our society and create a self-
perpetuating cycle of discrimination, which can greatly harm society overall.
The role of government is often to protect the anonymous masses from the
collective acts of self-interested individuals.2 " Advertising regulations,27 phar-
maceutical regulations, 279 and mandatory vaccination lawS280 all provide examples
of areas in which the state can limit a constitutionally protected right or interest of
an individual to protect the interests of society as a whole. In the case of NIPD,
the interest in protecting societal integrity would permit the state to regulate access
to NIPD for a particular condition when significant evidence demonstrates that
individual parents have been selecting for or against a particular genetic condition
in numbers that could harm society if left unregulated. The strength of the evi-
275. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 158 (citing Congressional Findings (14)(L), (G), in notes following 18
U.S.C. § 1531 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)).
276. Integrity, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/integrity (last visi-
ted Aug. 22,2012).
277. EzRA TAFT BENSON, THE PROPER ROLE OF GOVERNMENT (1968), available at http://www.
zionsbest.com/proper role.html ("[I1t is generally agreed that the most important single function
of government is to secure the rights and freedoms of individual citizens.").
278. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (restricting false or
misleading statements in advertisements for commercial products).
279. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 469 F.3d 129, 138
(D.C. Cir. 2006) (restricting access to potentially life-saving cancer treatments that had not yet
received FDA approval).
280. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38 (1905) (requiring an individual to receive an involuntary
vaccination against smallpox to provide protection to the larger community).
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dence supporting the existence of a harmfil trend will determine the relative
weight of this interest under the exceedingly persuasive justification standard.
Given sufficient evidence demonstrating an increasingly harmful trend in indi-
vidual reproductive choices, the state interest in protecting societal integrity should
be sufficient to outweigh a woman's interest in a particular genetic test and permit
the state to pass an RBTP.
Restrictions on individual autonomy have often been justified using John
Stuart Mill's harm principle.28' Mill argued that "[a]s soon as any part of a
person's conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others, society has jurisdic-
tion over it, and the question of whether the general welfare will or will not be
promoted by interfering with it becomes open to discussion."28 2 Prenatal genetic
testing and selective abortion have been considered private actions that affect a
limited range of individuals-the pregnant woman, her family and loved ones,
the provider, and the fetus's father and his family. Under Mill's harm principle,
state interests in restricting prenatal genetic testing and selective abortion have
been equally narrow because the affect of any particular decision on society as a
whole was minimal. As a result, a woman's personal interest in being able to
exercise her reproductive autonomy has consistently outweighed the state's interest
in protecting the previability fetus or the interests of other parties in the child's
birth.283  By recognizing a state interest in protecting the medical profession's
integrity and ethics as a whole, however, the Carhart decision opened the door to
the possibility that state interests in protecting groups of people beyond the
immediately affected parties could gain traction in abortion jurisprudence.284
With respect to prenatal genetic testing and selection, the absence of a strong
claim of societal harm has led scholars, most notably John Robertson, to focus
281. See, e.g., Jaime S. King, Predicting Probability: Regulating the Future of Preimplantation Genetic
Sreening, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 283, 301-02 (2008); Robertson, Era of
Genomics, supra note 97, at 445.
282. JOHN STUARTMILL, ON LIBERTY 73 (Elizabeth Rapaported., Hackett Publg Co. 1978) (1859).
283. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S.
622 (1979); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
284. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007); see also Suter, supra note 85, at 1595-97 (arguing
that Carharls focus on the impact to outside parties should not be permitted to subsume the rights of
the pregnant woman and her provider). Carharls creation of a new state interest in protecting the
medical profession's integrity and ethics has met with significant criticism for grounding its basis in
intuition and personal morality rather than reasoned principles with transparent standards. This
does not necessarily mean, however, that any new standard based on protecting societal interests
must suffer from similar flaws. See also George J. Annas, The Supreme Court and Abortion Rights,
356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2201, 2201-03, 2206 (2007) (describing the Carhart Court's move away
from deferring to medical judgment with respect to abortions and other medical decisions made in
the course of treatment).
57
HeinOnline  -- 60 UCLA L. Rev. 57 2012
60 UCLA L. REV. 2 (2012)
their analysis of the relative interests almost entirely on which factors would affect
the reproductive decision of the woman.285 Robertson has argued that "[t]he
strongest case for the parents is if they would not reproduce unless they could
select that trait."286 Because of the limited immediate harm to other parties,
Robertson's approach would allow a woman's willingness not to reproduce without
selecting a trait to justify striking down nearly any reasons-based testing prohi-
bition.287 Robertson also argued, however, that if reproductive use of genetic
information posed a substantial risk to others or to society as a whole, it might
justly be limited.288 NIPD's potential to dramatically increase the range of prena-
tal genetic tests available and the population of pregnant women receiving diag-
nostic genetic information brings these issues to the forefront.289
The collective results ofindividual reproductive decisions can produce radical
changes in the makeup of society that are self-perpetuating and reinforcing.
Nonmedical sex selection provides a pertinent example because it reveals both the
impact of a low-cost, minimal-risk testing method and the self-reinforcing nature
of prejudice. Improvements in technology, mainly the availability of cheap, easily
transportable ultrasound machines, have made nonmedical sex selective abortion
possible everywhere from rural towns and villages to major metropolitan areas.290
This has resulted in an overwhelming upsurge in the birth of boys in numerous
countries worldwide, which in Asia alone has resulted in the loss of over 160 mil-
lion potential women.29' While sex selection practices in China and India have
long been known, demographic data demonstrating significant gender imbalances
due to sex selection have also been reported in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia,
Pakistan, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam.292 Defying a single
stereotype, sex selection practices occur "among Hindus, Muslims and Christians;
among ethnic and political rivals; in economic powerhouses and in countries just
285. Robertson, Era ofGenomics, supra note 97, at 448. Robertson largely discusses reproductive selection
in the context of selecting embryos created through in vitro fertilization based on information
provided through preimplantation genetic diagnosis rather than on prenatal genetic diagnosis and
selective abortion. Id.
286. Id.at465.
287. Id. at 461-68 (extending the argument used to justify reproductive selection based on genetic sus-
ceptibility to diseases and disorders to homosexuality and perfect pitch).
288. Id. at 448-49.
289. King, supra note 22, at 3.
290. HVISTENDAHL, supra note 82, at 5 ("The link to technology was alarming, for it meant that India's
skewed sex ratio at birth was an outgrowth of economic progress, not backwards traditions.").
291. Id. at 5-6. For perspective, 160 million women is more than the entire female population of the
United States. Id. at 6.
292. Id at 10.
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on the cusp of development."293 These changes have skewed the worldwide male-
to-female ratio to a biologically impossible level.294 The impact of these individ-
ual choices on society largely remains to be seen. Predictions include a wide range
of repercussions from "visible threats to women, including sex trafficking, bride
buying, and forced marriages" 295 to changes in marriage and fertility patterns and
"unrest among young adult males who are unable to find partners."296
While the United States maintains a historically normal male-to-female
ratio of 105 to one hundred,297 research demonstrates that Americans have an
interest in nonmedical sex selection as well. In a survey of prospective American
parents, 25 to 35 percent state that they would use sex selection techniques if they
were readily available.298 For instance, when he began offering "no questions
asked" nonmedical sex selection through preimplantation genetic diagnosis
(PGD)299 at his fertility clinic in Los Angeles, Fertility Institutes, Jeffery Steinberg
noted that "[tjhe patient response was crazy. We had twenty [phone] lines light
up."300 Nonmedical sex selection now represents about 70 percent of Fertility
Institutes's practice.301 The United States is also not devoid of parents who would
go to great lengths to select their future offspring based on other nonmedical
characteristics. A recent study performed at the New York University Human
Genetic Program found that nearly 10 percent of patients would test for genes
associated with traits such as longevity, superior intelligence, superior athletic
ability, or height if they were available.302 Likewise, when Fertility Institutes
advertised it would soon provide PGD for hair color, eye color, and skin pigmen-
tation, it reported that within a week it had half a dozen couples on the waiting
293. Id.
294. Id. at 6; see also The World Factbook-Field Listing: Sex Ratio, CIA.GOV, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2018.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2012). The shift in
birth ratios in certain communities went from 105 boys for every one hundred girls, which is
generally thought to be the naturally occurring ratio, to as high as 176 boys for every one hundred
girls. Id.
295. HVISTENDAHL, supra note 82, at 15.
296. The World Factbook-FieldListing: Sex Ratio, supra note 294.
297. Id.
298. HVISTENDAHL, supra note 82, at 255 (citing DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: How
MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS DRiVE THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 100 (2006)).
299. PGD is the process of removing a cell from an embryo created through in vitro fertilization and
performing a genetic test on it to determine whether to transfer that embryo to the uterus for
implantation.
300. HVISTENDAHL, supra note 82, at 251 (latter alteration in original) (quoting her conversation with
Dr. Steinberg).
301. Id.at250.
302. See Consumers Desire More Genetic Testing, But Not Designer Babies, SCI. DAILY (Jan. 26, 2009),
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/01/090126100642.htm.
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list for a service that is much more invasive than NIPD and costs between $ 15,000
and $20000.303
NIPD has the capacity to put this kind of knowledge into nearly every preg-
nant woman's hands at a time in the pregnancy when abortions are easiest to
access and can be done discreetly. As each pregnant woman makes her decision
independently, society will not know the fill effect of those decisions for many
years, if not decades. The state arguably has a legitimate interest in preventing
large-scale societal harms that can result from individual reproductive decisions, if
and when discriminatory trends begin to develop.
However, defining an interest in protecting societal integrity will be chal-
lenging. Societal-level harms are often difficult to quantify, especially if the state
seeks to assert the interest to prevent a future harm to society. Shifts in perception,
discriminatory feelings, and preferences can be difficult to detect and measure
reliably. Further, determining the true reasons why a woman sought an abortion
and the factors that most influenced her decision will prove even more chal-
lenging. States could easily overestimate the potential harm or use the interest to
attempt to justify a wide range of potentially unnecessary restrictions. However,
waiting for a significant societal harm to manifest itself filly, as sex selection has
done in China and India, will take decades to recover from and should be avoided.
As a result, courts should evaluate the strength of the state interest in protecting
societal integrity based upon the strength of evidence that a problematic trend is
beginning to develop. Only if a state can provide empirical data that demonstrates
a growing trend of discriminatory testing and selective abortion at the population
level that creates an exceedingly persuasive justification for restricting access to
reproductive genetic testing should the RBTP be upheld. Producing this evidence
will require maintaining anonymized records on both prenatal testing trends and
certain genetic characteristics of newborns. In states like California, where both
prenatal and newborn screening are already carefully monitored, gaining access to
this data will not be extremely cumbersome.304 Nearly all newborns in the coun-
try are subjected to newborn genetic-screening blood tests, which could be
anonymized and analyzed for trends in selective abortion on a national or state
303. Naik, supra note 272; see also MYRTLE FLIGHT &MICHAEL R. MEACHMAN, LAW, LIABILITY,
AND ETHICS FORMEDICAL OFFICE PROFESSIONALS 238-39 (5th ed. 2011). Fertility Institutes
ended up not offering the service for the time being. Naik, supra note 272.
304. The California Prenatal Screening program is the largest in the country and currently screens
approximately 70 percent of all pregnant women in the state. For more information, see Prenatal
Screening Program, supra note 32. See also Genetic Disease Screening Program, CAL. DEP'T PUB.
HEALTH, http://www.cdph.ca.gov/programs/centerforfamilyhealth/Pages/GDSPFactSheet.aspx
(last modified Mar. 7,2011).
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level.305 As more evidence of an imbalance or social discrimination appears,
RBTPs designed to protect the interest in societal integrity have a greater chance
of surviving a constitutional challenge.
The major benefit of permitting a state to regulate access to prenatal genetic
tests based on an interest in societal integrity lies in the fact that it does not require
the state to delineate genetic conditions that are appropriate for selective abortion.
A state interest sufficient to uphold an RBTP would exist only when population-
based data demonstrated trends of discrimination via selective abortion that could
harm society as a whole if left unchecked. Requiring a state to demonstrate trends
in NIPD and selective abortion practices removes much of the opportunity for
state arbitrariness in determining which tests to restrict and the inevitable erosion
of a woman's ability to access NIPD that would result from recognizing the inter-
est in protecting potential life.
Further, unlike the interest in protecting potential life and the impositions-
based maternal interest, the state interest in societal integrity would serve to reduce
selective abortion for conditions that became more of a burden because of in-
creased discrimination and reduced social support. As the availability of social
support services decreases and as discrimination increases for a particular condition,
the imposition of having a child with that condition increases significantly. Under
an impositions-based approach, increased discrimination and decreased support
services would therefore warrant permitting abortion for that condition, while an
interest in societal integrity would work to counteract those pressures. For exam-
ple, in the absence of a societal integrity interest, if discrimination against women
became more severe, such that it became a greater burden for parents to support
daughters, as it is in many areas ofthe world, the increased burden would strength-
en women's interests in being able to abort based on sex. As the burden of having
a daughter increases, the state's interest in protecting potential life remains the
same, which would likely serve to tip the balance in favor of permitting sex
selection in this scenario. Ifthe state has an interest in preserving societal integrity,
however, that interest would counterbalance the woman's interest in selecting
based on sex to avoid additional burdens of having a female child, and it would
permit the state to enact RBTPs to reduce and counteract further discrimina-
305. While no genetic test is truly anonymous, the state should make significant efforts to ensure the
privacy of the information and strictly limit use of and access to the material. Under no circum-
stances should the state be able to sell or transfer this genetic information for other forms of research
without the express consent of the parents.
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tion.30 In this instance, RBTPs would serve both an expressive function of
informing pregnant women that the government does not approve of NIPD use
for nonmedical sex selection and a regulatory function of stifling the practice.
Overall, widespread use of NIPD will strengthen some state interests in reg-
ulation while weakening others. The state interests in maintaining medical stand-
ards and protecting societal integrity offer the strongest support for regulation.
Regulations aimed at serving the state interest in maintaining medical standards
are likely to appear as NIPD enters clinical practice, while regulations intended to
protect societal integrity should not appear for quite some time, as significant data
gathering and analysis at the population level would be required to support an
RBTP. State interests in protecting women's health and the medical profession's
integrity and ethics are unlikely to receive much traction as means to justify
RBTPs, as NIPD's blood test presents little physical risk to the mother and has a
low "repugnance" factor for physicians. Finally, NIPD does not alter the state's
interest in protecting potential life. Courts considering the constitutionality of
RBTPs should weigh these factors together against the strength of the pregnant
woman's interests in accessing NIPD for a particular condition.
b. The Woman's Interests
How courts define a woman's interests will determine her ability to assert a
right to access NIPD for various conditions. A woman's interests in accessing
NIPD should account for both equality and liberty interests. From a sex equality
perspective, the strength of a woman's interest in NIPD for a particular genetic
condition will depend on the relative burden placed on her by having a child with
the relevant condition as compared to a child without the condition and on the
value of knowing that information at the earliest possible point in the pregnancy.
The Constitution has historically protected three areas of liberty related to NIPD:
procreative, personal, and parental.3 0' Each of these interests must be separately
accounted for, along with a woman's interest in sex equality. Any attempt to eval-
uate her interest in NIPD must account for all of the protected decisions that the
information would inform, not just the abortion decision. The following Subparts
describe equality and liberty interests and analyze their relevance to RBTPs.
306. In addition, the state could improve state support and programs to reduce the burden of having a
daughter.
307. See Rao, supra note 92, at 1489.
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i. Sex Equality Interests
At the core ofwomen's sex equality interest in NIPD is an acknowledgment
of the burdens often disproportionately placed on women in rearing all children
and especially in rearing children with special or additional needs.308 Preventing
pregnant women from obtaining information about the genetic characteristics of
their fetuses would, in many cases, significantly compromise their ability to make
decisions regarding their role in society and their life path. The impact on a
woman of having a child with a specific genetic characteristic should be weighed
as one factor in her overall interest in accessing NIPD for that condition.
The Court should also consider the benefit to women of discovering a condi-
tion early in the first trimester, as opposed to the middle of the second trimester,
when ultrasound, invasive genetic testing, and other forms of identifying disorders
are available. Early knowledge would permit a woman to make a decision regard-
ing termination long before the pregnancy showed or she needed to reveal her con-
dition to her employer. She would also not spend as much time suffering from
morning sickness, exhaustion, and other debilitating physical and emotional
symptoms of pregnancy. NIPD's early timing gives women who decide to selec-
tively abort the ability to do so at a time that avoids some of the negative physical
side effects of pregnancy in the first trimester and the complications of having an
abortion after a visible pregnancy. Both features greatly promote equality for
women.
A woman's sex equality interest in testing for a particular condition, however,
could also be quite low if she wanted to test for genetic conditions that would not
require substantially more care than a normal child would or for conditions that
would not influence her decision to abort. The strength of a woman's sex equality
interests in NIPD will depend significantly on the genetic condition or char-
acteristic tested for.
ii. Liberty Interests
In addition to her equality interests, a woman also has a wider range of liberty
interests in accessing NIPD testing than she does in selective abortion. As noted
308. See Priscilla J. S mith, GiveJustice Ginsburg What She Wants: Uhing Sex EqualityArments to Demand
Examination ofthe Legitimacy of State Interests in Abortion Regulation, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER
377,411-12 (2011).
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above, she has interests in procreative, personal, and parental liberty.309 While the
vast majority of cases that address abortion regulation have focused on procreative
liberty, examining this interest in isolation no longer makes sense in the context
of new reproductive technologies and reproductive genetic testing.310 The further
a regulation drifts from directly regulating abortion or contraception, the more
likely it is also to infringe upon an individual's personal and parental liberties.
Depending on the genetic condition tested for, NIPD results can be used to
inform decisions in each of these areas.
Procreative liberty encompasses a woman's right to be free from undue govern-
ment interference in deciding whether to have an abortion,311 to use birth con-
trol,312 to procreate with a particular partner,"' or to refuse permanent sterilization.3 14
The Supreme Court has a long history of protecting an individual's right to decide
to avoid procreation.315 The strength of a woman's procreative liberty interest in
being able to access NIPD should depend entirely on the relevance of the infor-
mation to her decision to have an abortion.
Personal liberty encompasses the notion ofbodily integrity, which, generally
stated, is the idea that an individual should be free from unwarranted intrusions
into his or her body. 16 In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department ofHealth," the
Supreme Court held that the sanctity of the human body is fundamental, such
that "[e]very violation of a person's bodily integrity is an invasion of his or her
liberty.""' The notion of personal liberty also extends beyond the medical setting
to protect an individual's ability to make autonomous decisions regarding intimate
309. See Rao, supra note 92, at 1488-89. A woman may also have First Amendment interests in access
to NIPD. See Schaibley, supra note 204; Suter, supra note 85, at 1517-20. These interests are
outside the scope of this Article, but I plan to take up this issue in the future.
310. Rao, supra note 92, at 1488-89.
311. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992).
312. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-55 (1972).
313. Lovingv. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967).
314. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 542-43 (1942) (striking down an Oklahoma statute that
authorized the forced sterilization of thrice-convicted chicken thieves).
315. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (reaffirming and redefining the right to have an abortion established in Roe v.
Wade); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (establishing the right to privacy in selecting to have
an abortion); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (extending the right to use contraception to all individuals);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (establishing the right of married couples to
use contraception). See generally Cohen, supra note 173 (discussing whether the federal Constitution
protects a right not to procreate).
316. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Casey, 505 U.S. at 857; Cruzan v. Dir., Mo.
Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38 (1905).
317. 497 U.S. 261.
318. Id. at 342 (citing Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 237 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part)).
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actions taken with their own body. In Lavrence v. Texas,319 the Court expanded
substantive due process protections to include an individual's decision to engage
in consensual sex without fear of criminal sanction.320 In the context of NIPD, a
woman's personal liberty interests would depend on the relevance of the NIPD
test results to her decisions about what activities to engage in for the remainder of
the pregnancy. NIPD could inform decisions to engage in further invasive genetic
testing, abortion procedures, prenatal therapies, or other activities including exer-
cise, acupuncture, massage, and sex.
Finally, parental liberty includes the ability to make decisions about how to
raise and educate children.321 In Troxel v. Granville,322 the Supreme Court held
that existing precedent supports the idea "that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make
decisions concerning the care, custody and control of their children."3 23 In many
instances, NIPD results could help inform prospective parents' decisionmaking
regarding how best to care for their children both while they are in the womb and
after they are born. Having advanced knowledge regarding a child's medical or
behavioral conditions can enable a parent to prepare for a child's medical, nutri-
tional, educational, and social needs as early as possible. For many conditions, like
phenylketonuria, which requires a specific diet to avoid significant brain damage,
early intervention is key to a positive outcome.324
For some genetic conditions, women will find NIPD information important
for a range of intimate decisions. For instance, using NIPD to test for congenital
adrenal hyperplasia (CAH) touches all three protected liberty interests. CAH,
which causes genital ambiguity, would enable parents to decide between aborting
the fetus, prenatal hormone therapy taken by the woman during pregnancy, or
postnatal hormone therapy and corrective surgery.3 25 Other parents may want to
have the CAH diagnosis, even if they would never abort, to prepare themselves
for the birth of a child with the genetic disorder and to have time to learn more
about the condition and the available resources. NIPD for other conditions will
reveal information relevant to personal preferences but that is not as germane to
319. 539 U.S. 558.
320. Id. at 578.
321. Pierce v. Socy of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,400 (1923).
322. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
323. Id. at 66.
324. See generally Phenylketonuria, PJBMED HEALTH, http://www.ncbi.nlm.riih.gov/pubmedhealth/
PMH0002150 (last reviewed June 17, 2011).
325. See Robbert J.P. Rijnders et al., ClinicalApplications of Cell-Free FetalDNA From Maternal Plasma,
103 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 157, 161-63 (2004).
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fundamental decisions about how to treat, how to raise, and whether to have a
child. Such conditions may include sex, physical characteristics such as hair, eye,
and skin color, and predispositions to minor medical conditions such as eczema,
acne, and ear infections. The value of a woman's interest in prenatal genetic infor-
mation will span a wide spectrum from highly important to relatively unimportant
with respect to her intimate personal, procreative, and parental decisionmaking.
Time and again, the Court has protected individuals' right to make decisions
regarding their own person, procreation, and parenting with minimal govern-
ment interference.326 As a result, existing doctrine provides an excellent framework
for determining the strength of a woman's interest in receiving prenatal infor-
mation about a particular genetic characteristic. The importance of genetic
information to a pregnant woman should be highest when it is directly relevant to
multiple constitutionally protected decisions regarding reproduction and family.
The more the information provided by a prenatal genetic test informs her consti-
tutionally protected decisions, the more weight the woman's interests in being
able to have the test ought to receive.
2. Balancing the Interests: Applications to Exemplar Genetic Conditions
Once a woman's interests in accessing a particular genetic test have been
established, the court should weigh her interests against those of the state in
prohibiting it. To demonstrate how the suggested framework might play out with
respect to certain types of NIPD testing, this Subpart evaluates the relative state
and individual interests in testing fetuses for three genetic conditions using the
exceedingly persuasive justification test.
a. Tay-Sachs Disease
Consider a woman who wants to use NIPD to test for Tay-Sachs disease, a
very severe recessive disorder that generally results in death by the age of five.327 If
she lives in a state that has passed legislation banning all prenatal genetic tests
prior to viability, how strong would her challenge to the law be under the exceed-
326. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558; Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992);
Santoskyv. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Parham v.J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Quilloinv. Walcott,
434 U.S. 246 (1978); Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158 (1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Meyer, 262 U.S. 390.
327. See Tay Sachs Disease, supra note 186.
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ingly persuasive justification test? In many ways, this disease represents one of
the most compelling reasons for permitting prenatal testing.3 28  This woman's
procreative liberty interest is very high in that the results of the test are likely to
influence her decision to have an abortion. Likewise, having a child with such a
disease is likely to place significant restrictions on her career as well as her social
and political interests, making her sex equality interest also very high. While no
prenatal therapies for Tay-Sachs exist, the woman's personal liberty interest also
remains high because she may have a strong interest in avoiding the hardships of
pregnancy and childbirth to have a child that will suffer significantly for its short
life. Finally, she may have a more moderate parental liberty interest in being able
to access NIPD for Tay-Sachs as there is currently no cure for Tay-Sachs, nor is
there any means to slow its progression.3 29 However, knowing the child is affect-
ed prior to its birth would grant the parents time to contact specialists and learn
about ways to mitigate the disease's symptoms.
A state's interests in restricting access to NIPD for Tay- Sachs are compara-
tively quite low. As noted above, NIPD poses little to no risk to the pregnant
woman or the morality of the clinician performing the test. As a single gene,
Mendelian recessive disorder, Tay-Sachs is relatively simple to diagnose and lacks
much of the testing-accuracy challenges associated with more complex genetic
diseases. The state's interest in maintaining proper standards of medical care
would entitle it to ensure the test was accurate and reliable, but otherwise this
interest would not be sufficient to warrant restrictions on access. On the other
hand, states will maintain a strong interest in protecting unborn fetal life, which,
as I argue above, should be the same for all fetuses regardless of their genetic char-
acteristics. Further, the state interest in preserving societal integrity will also be
elevated in this instance, as many women will test for this condition and most that
receive a positive result for Tay-Sachs will abort. Women could face strong pres-
sures to use NIPD to test for Tay- Sachs and to abort if a positive result is found.
Further, families that do not abort could be subjected to increased discrimination
during their child's life. This discrimination could come from physicians, insur-
ance companies who refuse to pay for treatments if the condition was discovered
328. In fact, it is highly unlikely that any state would pass legislation banning access to genetic tests for
severe diseases with a short life expectancy and no cure (like Tay-Sachs), although the Missouri
legislature introduced the Abortion Ban for Sex Selection and Genetic Abnormalities Act of 2012
restricting abortion for any genetic abnormality. H.B. 1933, 96th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess.
(Mo. 2012).
329. See Arthur Schoenstadt, Treatmentfor Tay-Sachs:An Overview, EMEDTV, http://nervous-system.
emedtv.com/tay-sachs-disease/treatment-for-tay-sachs.html (last updated Aug. 24, 2010).
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during pregnancy,330 and other parents. However, these interests pale in compar-
ison to those of the woman.
Overall, the woman's procreative liberty and sex equality interests would be
high enough in this case to outweigh the state interests in protecting the life of the
unborn and societal integrity. In addition, a woman's interests in personal and
parental liberty should serve to bolster her case for access to the test. The state
interest in protecting societal integrity should not rise to the level of an exceedingly
persuasive justification. In cases like Tay-Sachs, where women's liberty and equal-
ity interests are strong, their right to make decisions about their bodies, reproduc-
tion, and parenting should remain highly protected as a fundamental right. In
instances where their interests are lower, the exceedingly persuasive justification
test would permit a state regulation of access to NIPD to stand.
b. Bipolar Disorder
Bipolar Disorder (BPD) is associated with unusually intense emotional
states that occur for distinct periods.3 1 A person with BPD has both manic epi-
sodes in which she is overly joyful or excited and depressive episodes when she is
extremely sad or hopeless.332 BPD is especially dangerous as patients may be at
risk for suicide during depressive episodes and for high-risk behaviors during
manic ones.133 BPD cannot be cured, but it can be effectively managed via contin-
uous long-term treatment.334 Families affected by BPD have long had an interest
in knowing whether they are likely to pass the disease on to their children. Family
and twin studies have consistently found that BPD is familial and heritable, but
determining the exact method of inheritance has proved elusive because of its
complex gene-environment interaction and varied phenotype.335
Pregnant women with a family history of BPD are likely to have more
varied levels of interest in using NIPD to test for the disease than women with a
330. The Affordable Care Act would prohibit this form of discrimination, but if the act is repealed, no
such protection will exist. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §
1201, 124 Stat. 119, 154-55 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3 0 0 gg (Supp. V 2011)) ("Prohibition of
Preexisting Condition Exclusions or Other Discrimination Based on Health Status"); 26 C.F.R. §
54.9815-2704T (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2704 (2012); 45 C.F.R. § 147.108 (2012).
331. See NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, BIPOLAR DISORDER 1-4 (2009), available at
httpI//www.nimh.nih.gov/healtlpublications/bipolar-disorder/nimh-bipolar-adults.pdf.
332. See id.
333. See id. at 2.
334. See id. at 19.
335. Jordan W. Smoller & Erica Gardner- Schuster, Genetics of Bipolar Disorder, 9 CURRENT
PSYCHIATRY REP. 504,504 (2007).
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family history of Tay-Sachs. The complex etiology of BPD makes it more
difficult to know which genetic and environmental factors will lead to an individ-
ual developing the disease, making reproductive decisionmaking significantly
more challenging. A woman's procreative liberty interest in having NIPD to test
for BPD will depend on the clinical validity of the test. Given the potentially
devastating nature of the disease and the fact that some women with BPD elect
not to reproduce to avoid passing it on to their children,33 6 women would have a
strong procreative liberty interest in a highly accurate test. But as the clinical
validity of the test decreased, so would their procreative liberty interests. As with
Tay-Sachs, a woman's personal liberty interest can be equated with the likelihood
that if the test came back at elevated risk, she would decide to abort.
The strength of a woman's parental liberty interest and her sex equality inter-
est will depend in part on the age of onset of the particular subgroup of BPD that
her fetus carries. Epidemiological data suggest that there are four subgroups of
BPD that can be differentiated by age of onset: childhood BPD, which presents
between the ages of six and thirteen; early BPD, which presents at age seventeen or
eighteen; intermediate onset, which presents in the mid-twenties or early thirties;
and late onset, which presents in the mid-forties.337 Of these, childhood BPD
has historically been considered quite rare, but the diagnosis is becoming more
common.338 A woman's parental liberty and sex equality interests will be the
highest with a diagnosis of childhood BPD and lowest for late-onset BPD because
the burdens and decisionmaking responsibility will fall more directly on her as a
parent if symptoms present while the child is a minor. As more information is
discovered about the environmental factors that contribute to the development of
BPD, the woman's interest in having an NIPD test for late-onset BPD is likely
to rise, as she might make significant decisions about how to raise her child based
336. For an illuminating example of this inclination, see, for example, Natasha Tracy, Would You Have a
Child if You Knew They Would Have Bipolar?, BREAKING BIPOLAR BLOG (Aug. 24, 2012),
http://www.healthyplace.com/blogs/breakingbipolar/2012/08/would-you-have-child-if-knew-
they-would-bipolar, and the accompanying reader comments.
337. Frank Bellivier et al., Age at Onset in BipolarlAffective Disorder. Further Evidencefor Three Subgroups,
160 AM.J. PSYCHIATRY 999, 1000 (2003) (finding that the age at onset ofbipolar affective disorder
in siblings was likely to be the same, suggesting a familial and potentially genetic relationship driving
the subgroups); Janet Wozniak et al., Mania-Like Symptoms Suggestive of Childhood-Onset Bipolar
Disorder in Clinically Referred Children, 34 J. Avi. ACAD. CHILD. ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY
867, 867-68 (1995) (arguing that the incidence of childhood bipolar disorder is not as rare as orig-
inally thought).
338. ChildandAdolescentBipolarDiworder, NATL ALLIANCEONMENTAL ILLNESS, http://www.nami.org/
Template.cfm?Section=ByIllness&template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&Cont
entlD=13107 (last reviewed July 2010).
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on the information provided in the test. Overall, a woman's interest in NIPD to
test for BPD is relatively high, but it will depend on the clinical validity of the test,
the specific subgroup of BPD that runs in the family, and the ability to reduce the
onset of disease through controlling environmental stimuli.
The state interests will also vary more with BPD than with Tay-Sachs. For
all genetic conditions, the state's interest in protecting the mother's health, unborn
human life, and the medical profession's ethics should all remain relatively con-
stant. However, the state interest in maintaining medical standards will vary sig-
nificantly with the clinical validity of the NIPD test for BPD. A test with low
clinical validity might cause a pregnant woman to undergo significant stress in
making a termination decision, give birth to an affected child that she would have
aborted, or abort a healthy fetus. This interest should carry significant weight
sufficient to prevent a test that did not meet minimum standards for analytical and
clinical validity from entering the prenatal commercial market.
The state interest in societal integrity should also play a significant role in
determining whether a state can regulate access to NIPD for BPD. The availa-
bility of NIPD for BPD is likely to increase significantly the stigma facing indi-
viduals and families affected by BPD. The idea that mental illnesses, like BPD,
have genetic causes and occur across all races, genders, and socioeconomic groups
has served to reduce the overall stigma of mental illness, which historically has
been extremely high. 39 The existence of a noninvasive prenatal test has the poten-
tial to create a sense of control, and therefore permitting blame, over whether one
has a child with the disease. Further, such social stigma and judgment have the
capacity to place coercive pressure on women who receive a positive diagnosis to
abort the fetus. To the extent that the individuals with a personal or family history
of BPD that use NIPD and selective abortion tend to be wealthier or better edu-
cated, BPD could also become more heavily associated with individuals with
lower incomes and less education, which could further increase the stigma associ-
ated with the disorder. This trend could create a downward spiral of discrimination
against both the mentally ill and the lower class, which could firther encourage
339. For review of some of the history of mental illness stigma, see ON THE STIGMA OF MENTAL
ILLNESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR RESEARCH AND SOCIAL CHANGE (Patrick W.
Corrigan ed., 2005); see abAo U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &HUiMAN SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH: A
REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 9 (1999), available at http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/
access/NNBBHS.pdf ("[I]ncreasingly effective treatments for mental disorders promises to be an
effective antidote [to stigma]. When people understand that mental disorders are not the result of
moral fallings or limited will power, but are legitimate illnesses that are responsive to specific
treatments, much of the negative stereotyping may dissipate.").
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individuals to test and selectively abort.340 A government seeking to regulate
access to NIPD for BPD based on its interest in societal integrity would have to
closely monitor newborn blood tests, public sentiment toward those with mental
illness, and the trajectory of future resources available to care for such individuals.
Overall, the ability of the state to regulate access to NIPD for BPD will de-
pend entirely on the circumstances. The state should be able to prevent a test with
low clinical validity from entering the market. If a test with high clinical validity
entered the market for all subgroups of BPD, the pregnant woman's interests
should outweigh those of the state, unless stigma against the disease had become
so rampant that a drastic imposition on a woman's Fourteenth Amendment rights
proved exceedingly justifiable, which seems unlikely given the strength of her
interests. In the case of a test with moderate clinical validity, the challenge should
turn on the strength of the state's evidence of harm to society and the subgroup of
BPD tested for.
c. Predisposition to Homosexuality
The final genetic test is the most challenging but probably the most im-
portant to consider. For decades, scientists have been searching for a biological
basis of homosexuality.34' In fact, 23andMe began the first genome-wide associa-
tion study in April 2012 to study the biology of sexual orientation.342 Recent
studies suggest that while a single genetic mutation does not determine an indi-
vidual's sexuality, sexual preference does have both genetic and environmental
components.343 Given the potential for a genetic predisposition to homosexuality,
a number of prospective parents may wish to screen their fetuses for any alleles
known to be associated with sexual preference.
340. A similar argument could apply to the stigma associated with a number of genetic diseases and
disorders, not only those related to mental illness.
341. See US Researchers FindEvidence That Homosexuality Linked to Genetics, GUARDIAN, Dec. 1, 2008,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/dec/01/homosexuality-genetics-usa; see also Ryan D.
Johnson, Homosexuality: Nature or Nurture, ALLPSYCH J. (Apr. 30, 2003), http://allpsych.com/
joumal/homosexuality.htm1.
342. See ScottH, DoAsk, Do Tell, SPIrToON (Mar. 30,2012, 7:00 AM), http://spittoon.23andme.com/
23andme-and-you/do-ask-do-tell.
343. See Homosexual Behavior Due to Genetic and Environmental Factors, E! SC. NEWS (June 28, 2008,
5:21 PM), http://esciencenews.com/artides/2008/06/28/homosexual.behavior.due.genetics.and.
environmental.factors (citing a study from Sweden published in the Archives of Sexual Behavior);
Johnson, supra note 341; see aAo J. Michael Bailey et al., Genetic and Environmental Influences on
Sexual Orientation and Its Correlates in an Austrian Twin Sample, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 524 (2000).
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A woman's procreative liberty interest in obtaining a test for genes associated
with homosexuality will vary significantly depending on social attitudes regarding
homosexuality and the clinical validity of the test. Given the widely varied opin-
ions regarding homosexuality in the United States,344 I am willing to venture that
for some percentage of the population, a predisposition toward homosexuality
would be determinative of a termination decision. However, because those who
believe that homosexuality is a sin are also likely to believe that abortion is wrong
for any reason, the group willing to abort for a predisposition to homosexuality
may be quite small. Enlarging this group, at least minimally, may be women, who
are not homophobic, but are concerned about the ability of a homosexual child to
thrive in areas where homosexuality is not well tolerated and want to abort on that
basis.3 45 As with the above examples, the strength of a woman's personal liberty
interest depends entirely on whether the information from NIPD would influence
her abortion decision.346
As with nonmedical sex selection, access to NIPD to test for a predisposition
to homosexuality disentangles procreative liberty arguments from sex equality
arguments. While women who oppose homosexuality may have a strong claim
that denying them access to NIPD to test for a predisposition infringes upon their
procreative liberty, they cannot make a similar claim that denying access to infor-
mation about whether their fetus has a predisposition to homosexuality reduces
their ability to stand as equal citizens with men. As a result, their sex equality in-
terest in accessing NIPD to detect a predisposition to homosexuality is nonexistent.
Women do, however, have a somewhat stronger parental liberty interest.
For the many parents that would welcome a child with a predisposition to homo-
sexuality, knowledge in advance of a child's birth may assist them with understand-
ing their child better and tailoring their parenting decisions accordingly. Since
sexuality does not fully develop until a child is older, however, a parent's interest in
this information prior to birth should not be weighted too heavily.
States may have strong interests in maintaining medical standards and
protecting societal integrity in regulating NIPD for a predisposition to homosexu-
344. Frank Newport, For First Time, Majority ofAmericans Favor Legal Gay Marriage: Republicans and
Older Americans Remain Opposed, GALLUP POL. (May 20, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/
147662/First-Time-Majority-Americans-Favor-Legal-Gay-Marriage.aspx (illustrating the divide
between those in support of and those opposed to gay marriage).
345. 1 am indebted to Madeline Morrison of the UCIALaw Review for this point.
346. SeeJohn A. Robertson, Reproductive Rights andReproductive Technology in 2030, in CONSTITUTION
3.0: FREEDOM & TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 155 (Jeffrey Rosen & Benjamin Wittes eds.,
2011), available athttp://www.brookings.edu/-/media/research/files/paper&/2011/1/21%/20reproductive
o2Otechnology%20robertson/0121_reproductive technology robertson.pdf.
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ality. Once again, states have a strong interest in restricting the availability of
commercial NIPD for a predisposition to homosexuality until the test has
established a minimum threshold level of clinical validity. Because of the complex
etiology of sexual preference, genetic tests may never reach this minimum
threshold. One additional problem is that homosexuality is not considered a medi-
cal or psychiatric condition and therefore may be considered outside the authority
of the FDA and other regulatory bodies.347 Regulations governing genetic tests
should be drafted to ensure that genetic tests for all characteristics are required to
meet the same standards of quality and validity.
Finally, the state interest in protecting societal integrity may prove especially
relevant when considering NIPD for a predisposition to homosexuality because
of the testing's potential to lead to increased discrimination. Currently, America
is extremely divided on the fundamental rights of homosexual individuals.34 8
Debates have raged around the country regarding whether homosexuals can serve
openly in the military and whether they have the right to marry, engage in assisted
reproduction, and adopt children. The existence of genetic testing for a predis-
position to homosexuality could cut both ways in this debate. In order to have a
genetic test, scientists must understand the biological etiology of homosexuality.
The more evidence there is that homosexuality is biological, the more likely it is to
receive Fourteenth Amendment protections. However, the existence of a prenatal
genetic test could also simultaneously increase discrimination, prejudice, and se-
lective abortion of fetuses that screen positive. If such a test is ever created and
offered commercially, states should monitor public sentiment and newborn
genetic tests carefully to determine whether the test is increasing or decreasing dis-
criminatory sentiment and eugenic practices. Given the limited interests ofwomen
in testing for a predisposition to homosexuality, if trends of increased discrimina-
tion arise, the state may very well be able to demonstrate an exceedingly persuasive
justification to restrict access to NIPD for this purpose.
CONCLUSION
The technological advances of NIPD and whole genome sequencing have
the potential to offer pregnant women enormous amounts of genetic information
347. The FDA regulates genetic tests as medical devices. Is the Product a MedicalDevice?, U.S. FOOD<&
DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/
ClassifyYourDevice/ucm051512.htm (last updated Mar. 1, 2010).
348. See David Lauter, Poll: Support for Gay Marriage Continues to Rise, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2011,
http://articles.1atimes.com/2011/nov/03/news/1a-pn-pew-same-sex-marriage-20111103.
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about their fetuses early in the first trimester without a risk of miscarriage. These
developments could dramatically change reproductive practice and consequently
our reproductive rights. As states that oppose abortion become savvier about ways
to restrict access, their legislative attentions have turned to restricting access to
abortion based on the reason the procedure was sought. As NIPD expands the
information offered to pregnant women, it also expands the potential reasons a
woman could choose to have an abortion, as well as the number of potential reg-
ulations states could enact. Because reasons-based abortion prohibitions suffer
from significant constitutional and practical challenges, states will most likely try
to restrict access to NIPD for certain conditions to prevent abortions for certain
characteristics. Because of the potential for a strong connection between prenatal
genetic information and a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy, constitu-
tional challenges to these reasons-based testing prohibitions are likely to result.
Evaluating such a challenge under the undue burden standard set out in Casey,
however, does not permit adequate weighing of the full range of state and individ-
ual interests. As a result, I have proposed the use of intermediate scrutiny review,
which requires a state to have an exceedingly persuasive justification for restricting
access to NIPD. Such a review would weigh the state's interests against those of
the woman in accessing the test for a specific genetic condition and determine if,
under the circumstances, the state justification was exceedingly persuasive. The
relevant state's interests include protecting and maintaining medical standards,
protecting potential human life, protecting the health of the pregnant woman,
preserving the ethical and moral integrity of the medical profession, and a
proposed new interest: protecting societal integrity. The state interest in protect-
ing societal integrity is intended to permit the state to regulate access to genetic
tests in cases where the collective result of individual reproductive decisions has
the potential to create significant discrimination and societal harm. The woman's
interests include not just her interest in procreative liberty but also her interests in
personal liberty, parental liberty, and equality with men. Overall, the exceedingly
persuasive justification test favors the ability of pregnant women to access NIPD
for all conditions unless the state can demonstrate through empirical data the test's
lack of clinical validity or developing trends with the potential for societal harm.
As I have shown throughout the Article, the strength of each of the interests bal-
anced by the exceedingly persuasive justification test will vary significantly de-
pending on the genetic condition in question. With NIPD currently available for
Down syndrome, sex determination, and RhD status, and many biotechnology
companies making significant investments into the development of new tests, now
is the time to consider how this information will change our thoughts on repro-
ductive autonomy.
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To understand better the impact NIPD will have on reproductive medicine
and reproductive rights, firther research and analysis is needed in a wide variety of
areas. First, studies should examine pregnant women's opinions of NIPD and
the value of NIPD testing results for various conditions to pregnant women in their
procreative, personal, and parental decisionmaking. Second, better demographic
information is needed to understand the impact of NIPD on birthrates of chil-
dren with genetic conditions tested for by NIPD. Third, sociologists and an-
thropologists should explore the integration of NIPD into prenatal care and
examine its influence on social stigma associated with certain diseases and condi-
tions. Finally, as genetic testing technology moves away from specific genetic
tests to whole genome sequencing, the question of whether a woman has a right
to access the prenatal genetic information of her fetus becomes more than just a
Fourteenth Amendment question. The First Amendment may protect a woman's
right to have any portion of her fetus's genome revealed to her because any
restriction on a whole genome sequence would necessarily have to restrict the
communication of the results, rather than the provision of the test. Additional
exploration of the First Amendment right to access genetic information in the
context of whole genome sequencing is necessary to define firther the ever-
evolving scope of reproductive rights, as well as the future of genetic testing.
75
HeinOnline  -- 60 UCLA L. Rev. 75 2012
